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A THEORY OF THE FINE ARTS

LANIGAN.

A
THEORY OF THE FINE ARTS

CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO

MENTAL AND PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF HUMAN EXISTENCE.

BY

STEPHEN M. LANIGAN, A.B. T.C.D.

BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

BIBLIOTHECA BODLEIANA

> 'Omnes artes, quæ ad humanitatem pertinent, habent quoddam commune vinculum, et quasi cognatione quâdam inter se continentur.' Cicero.

> 'Reason must approach Nature with the view indeed of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose.' Kant, *Meiklejohn's Translation.*

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TO

ST. GEORGE MIVART, ESQ. F.R.S.

AS A TOKEN OF SINCERE REGARD,

THIS WORK IS INSCRIBED.

PREFACE.

This essay is an attempt to show that the popular Materialistic Philosophy of the present day has no such infallible character as is generally attributed to it, when applied to the explanation of facts of existence, which have their origin in the essential conditions of the intellectual principle in man.

This Philosophy is put forward by men who have attained a certain eminence by their successful labours in the advancement of Physical Science; and from the fact that they are so distinguished, they come with what would at first seem a certain recommendation as to their capabilities to decide on questions of more special interest to mankind.

But, on consideration, I believe it will be evident that this apparent qualification for such an important undertaking is in reality the very reason why they are incapable of even distinctly realising in thought the Mental and Moral principles with reference to which they so flippantly advance their crude opinions.

Relying for their arguments, as for their reputation, on phenomena which they have observed in the investigation of facts in Physical nature, they endeavour to explain all the facts of human experience by hypotheses which they have found sufficient to account for what are probably general laws of animal life in this world, or to ignore altogether whatever cannot be so accounted for. My object is to prove, that to try to explain Mental phenomena by means of Material laws is, from the diverse nature of both as subjects of human thought, utterly illogical; and further, that the process of mind, which from the nature of the objects concerned necessarily accompanies the investigation of the general laws which govern the phenomena of Material existences, so unfits the mental faculties for the study of Psychological Conditions as to bring about a positive inability to believe even in the existence of the lattter as facts of human experience, as real and as knowable as those of the Material world. In this way only can be explained the fierce antagonism which exists between students of Physical Science and those who devote their attention to the phenomena of Mind, which has been carried to such an extent by the former as to lead them to deny altogether the existence of those principles on which all religious and moral philosophy depends.

'To ask the question, whether Science is substantially true?' says one of their authors,[1] 'is much like asking whether the sun gives light.

'And it is because they are conscious how undeniably valid are most of its propositions, that the theological party regard Science with so much secret alarm.'

Here, by Science, is meant only *Physical* Science, which during the two thousand years of its growth has been so far from being at any time substantially true, that its history has ever been the history of errors, from time to time corrected by further experience.

Judging by the general law of the progress of Scientific discovery, it is possible, nay, extremely probable, that the theories of Evolution and Natural Selection, which now seem to account for the origin of the various species of animal life on this earth, may in another generation be found to be but a part of some still more general law of existence, or appear as false and as puerile as the elaborate machinery of cycles and epicycles which astronomers once imagined necessary to account for the motion of the heavenly bodies in space. Those who hold these theories are not more convinced of their truth than the astronomers before the time of Copernicus were of theirs.

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[1] Mr. Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, p. 19.

All that Physical Science can claim as to truth is no more than any other branch of human knowledge; viz. that its theories, examined by the light of reason, tend more and more to ultimate verification.

From the confessed inability of these writers to realise in thought those principles which are the foundation of Moral attributes, I believe they are ignorant of the results which the abrogation of such principles may bring about. In their bigoted desire to force their narrow-minded philosophy on the rest of mankind, they do not see that such teaching, like that of Voltaire and his school in France, directly tends to sap the foundations of the institutions which keep together the fabric of human society.

That their philosophy is false in its application is no preventative to its reception by the generality of people, because they are not sufficiently educated. This work, then, of mine is an effort, however feeble it may be, to prevent the injurious doctrines of men incapable of judging in such matters being received as true, simply because they are uncontradicted.

By a distinction between the Psychological and Physiological conditions of our being, on which depends the pleasure we derive from the apperception of what we call Beauty and Sublimity in the Fine Arts, I hope to show that there are undeniable facts of human nature which are inexplicable, unless the existence of Mental and Moral attributes be acknowledged as the special characteristic of the constitution of man.

In entering on this dissertation, I am not without fear that I am only about to travel over ground explored before by some of the numerous writers on Metaphysics.

From the earliest ages, the investigation of the phenomena relating to the intellectual part of human nature has ever been the favourite study of contemplative minds; it is possible therefore that the opinions set forth in the following pages have been anticipated, or shown to be fallacious. This treatise, however, is not intended as an exposition of the results to which the Science of Mind, as far as it is connected with the principles of what is called *taste*, has attained up to the present time.

It is an attempt to eliminate, from the numerous concomitant circumstances which go to form the taste in this or that individual man, those essential and necessary conditions in the constitution of all intellectual beings, as far as we know, which regulate and govern all ideas of the Beautiful and Sublime in Art.

If such a result as I have arrived at has been before propounded, I can only hope that my observations may add farther proof to support it; if it has been shown to be fallacious, this dissertation may have at least the effect of inducing others to turn their attention to the question.

One great name, that of Burke, is essentially connected with this subject, and perhaps to one who has not carefully examined the matter, this essay of mine may seem either in a great measure borrowed from that author, or a presumptuous attempt to set up my opinions in contradiction to his; but to any person who has well considered the questions he has so ably treated of, it will be evident that he has done so in an *historical* rather than a *philosophical* manner, in all cases merely describing the *effects* produced by the recognition of the Beautiful and Sublime, but never investigating the *principles* on which these feelings depend.

In some cases, indeed, he has reduced particular feelings to more general laws in our organisation; but he has not in any case attempted to refer them to the ultimate laws of our intellectual or physical nature. It is to examine those laws, and trace those feelings to their ultimate sources in our mental and bodily organisation, and thus to *supplement, not controvert,* the *Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful*, that this treatise is designed.

In some cases, however, I have ventured to differ from the opinions of that illustrious author, as in the chapter on the Sublime. With regard to this emotion, by an examination of it as suggested by works of Nature and Art, I believe I have shown that it does not universally depend on, or even is accompanied by, a feeling of *terror*, which Burke has stated to be, '' in all cases whatsoever, either more openly or latently the ruling principle of the sublime.'

The plan pursued in the following essay may be simply stated thus:

In accordance with what seems, as far as we know, to be the general law of creation, viz. ' that all things are double one against the other,' and as a particular instance of it, we are so formed by a beneficent Creator as to be capable of deriving pleasure from the contemplation of certain natural objects and others which are, to speak generally, the creations of our own minds. By a consideration of the twofold character of human beings, as composed of souls and bodies, and of the attributes which we *must* suppose either positively or negatively to be the peculiar characteristics of each element, I have endeavoured to discover on what particular parts of our constitution, Mental and Physical, the pleasure we derive from the contemplation of works of Art depends. And I feel certain that the consideration of the adaptation of our minds to receive pleasurable emotions from those objects which seem to us to have been so created solely for that purpose cannot fail, while it adds another fact to the proofs of apparent design throughout the universe, to excite in us the deepest feelings of gratitude to Him who is the Author of all good gifts to man.

In common with all writers on Mental Philosophy, I have experienced the great difficulty arising from being obliged to discuss questions relating to entities purely intellectual, in language composed of words which represent ideas suggested by analogies borrowed from Material phenomena.

The chief concern of mankind being about the qualities and laws of Matter, the common language consists principally of words which have reference to the laws and attributes of objects which are known only to us as distinct and different from those of Mind; it is almost impossible therefore to discuss questions relating to Mental phenomena without being liable to be misunderstood. I believe to this fact may be, in a great measure, attributed the disputes between modern philosophers with reference to the particular opinions of the first of British metaphysicians, Locke. Could M. Cousin, Dr. Reid, or Sir W. Hamilton have a conversation with that great thinker, I believe they would agree that what seems contradictory in various parts of the *Essay on the Human Understanding is* not the result of carelessness, as has been affirmed, but his deliberate intention to express in different phraseology his opinion on Mental phenomena, so that, not adopting uniformly any particular mode of expression in language borrowed from Material objects, his words might not be taken to imply any Material theory in questions relating to Mind.

For this reason therefore, throughout the following pages, I have not hesitated to adopt the words of another author whenever I found it necessary to explain, in his clear and forcible language, what I found myself unable to express as well; but in all such cases I have been careful to express my obligation for such assistance.[2]

Though I have endeavoured to trace the principles of taste to their source in the laws and conditions of the Human Mind, I would not have it understood that this treatise is not intended for popular perusal.

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[2] Especially with regard to the author of the *Prolegomena Logica.*

In every one of the subjects of which I have treated, I have endeavoured to express my meaning by reference to some subject at the present time a matter of popular opinion, less, indeed, with the hope of seeing my view of the question adopted, than of more clearly illustrating to the uneducated in Mental Philosophy the arguments I have used, and their application to the theory of the Fine Arts.

It is the peculiar characteristic of Metaphysical studies that every person carries about with him the material for such investigations; and to every man of average mental capacity the facts on which such a study rests (the phenomena of his own mind) are apparent in every act of consciousness. Every one is conscious that he wills, feels, thinks; yet there are but few who have ever seriously and intently turned their attention to the investigation of the laws which govern these mental acts, or ever realised in thought the distinction between Mind and Matter.

For this reason I have thought it necessary to treat at length of some of the phenomena of the Human Mind, in order to render intelligible to those who have not devoted their attention to such studies, the facts of existence on which my arguments are founded.

I have insisted on the existence of the Human

Mind as a principle in our nature as *certain* and *as knowable* as any other fact in the constitution of things of which we are cognisant; and throughout the whole of this work my object has been to endeavour, as far as I could, to controvert the one-sided though partially true Philosophy of the present day, which is put forward to explain the *whole phenomena* of existence by men of undeniable authority in matters relating to Physical Phenomena, but from this very reason, *on account of the nature of the pursuit to which they have devoted themselves*, and in which they have attained such great results, are least of all men qualified to form correct opinions with reference to facts of Mental existence.

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we are obliged to believe is entirely distinct from everything else in its attributes and powers. Upon more consideration, and as our intellectual capacities get more accustomed to this kind of speculation, we come to consider what makes us think of these distinctions; what it is that gives rise to such ideas in our minds.

Further, we begin to feel that we *know*, not these things in *themselves*, but that they are presented to our minds as the basis of certain attributes, and it is on account of the *necessity* which we are under of believing it impossible that these attributes of what we may now call Mind and Matter could coexist, that such a distinction is forced upon us. We know Mind only as that which thinks, wills, feels; and Matter, which is simply a negation of mind, and which possesses, as its attributes, form, colour, hardness, softness, &c. In ourselves, as human beings, this distinction is between our Corporeal organisation, which we have in common with all other animals, and our Mental organisation, as intellectual beings. As in ourselves, so in the entire universe, as far as we know, or can think, this distinction divides it into two ultimate facts of existence.

As regards ourselves, to speak in a general manner, we are *indirectly* conscious that we are complex machines, composed partly of a substance similar to that in the world around us, and partly of an essence which we are *directly* conscious of, essentially distinct from the former, and which we are irresistibly compelled to consider as ourselves.

The former we call our corporeal or bodily organisation, and the latter the Intellectual or Spiritual principle.

We perceive that these two elements of our existence as human beings are intimately connected, that they act and react on each other; but in what manner, we are utterly ignorant. This problem as to the connection between Mind and Matter, as soul and body, has occupied the attention of philosophers in all ages, but without the most remote approach to a solution. Speculations as to how *we* see or hear, how the sensations of the body are conveyed to the Mind, how the Mind acts by volition on the muscles of the body, have been attempted to be explained; but now chiefly, says Stewart, 'in consequence of Dr. Reid's writings, are rejected as unphilosophical and puerile.' I do not wish here to enter on a discussion as to the merit which is due to Dr. Reid for this discovery; but it seems to me that, with regard to the passage quoted from Locke, that philosopher was then speaking of the Physical cause of Sensation, and

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It is only *after a certain amount of thought concerning all mental attributes*, until we can realise how evanescent our ideas on such subjects, from their very nature, *must* be, that we can rest satisfied with the authority of consciousness on the subject. Consciousness is the only witness in the cause; we believe in its truth; no arguments can render it clearer. I only draw attention to it. Every one is conscious of the distinction.[1]

'Every man,' says Stewart, 'is impressed with an irresistible conviction that all his sensations, thoughts, and volitions belong to one and the same being—to that being which he calls himself—a being which he is led by the constitution of his nature to consider as something distinct from his body, and as not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of his organs.'[2]

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[1] The universal belief of mankind is thus beautifully expressed by Arbuthnot:

'What am I? Whence produced, and to what end?
Whence drew I being? to what period tend?
Am I th' abandon'd orphan of blind chance,
Dropp'd by wild atoms in disorder'd dance?
Or from an endless chain of causes wrought,
And of unthinking substance born with thought?
Or am I what I seem, mere flesh and blood?
A branching channel with a mazy flood?
The purple stream that through my vessels glides,
Dull and unconscious flows, like common tides;
The pipes through which the circling juices stray
Are not the thinking I, no more than they;
This frame, compacted with transcendent skill
Of moving joints, obedient to my will,
Nursed from the fruitful glebe, like yonder tree,
Waxes and wanes: I call it mine, not me.
New matter still the mouldering mass sustains;
The mansion changed, the tenant still remains,
And from the fleeting stream repair'd by food
Distinct as is the swimmer from the flood.'

Sir W. Hamilton thus discusses the question: 'I turn my attention on my being, and find that I have organs, and I have thoughts; my body is the complement of my organs. Am I, then, my body, or any part of my body? This cannot be. The matter of my body, in all its parts, is in a perpetual flux, in a perpetual process of renewal. I—I do not pass away. I am not renewed. None, probably, of the molecules which constituted my organs some years ago form part of the material system which I now call mine. It has been made up anew; but I am still what I was of old. These organs may be mutilated; one, two, or any number of them may be removed; but not the less do I continue to be what I was, one and entire.

'It is even not impossible to conceive me existing deprived of every organ. It is I therefore who have these organs, or this body. I am neither organ nor body. . . . . I can conceive myself to exist apart from every organ; but if I try to conceive myself without a thought, without some form of consciousness, I am unable. This or that thought may not be necessary, but of some thought it is necessary that I should be conscious, otherwise I can no longer conceive myself to be. A suspension of thought is thus a suspension of my intellectual existence. I am therefore essentially a thinking, a conscious being, and my true character is that of an intelligence—an intelligence served by organs.'[3]

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[2] *Philosophy of the Human Mind.*

In these quotations are contained the statement of the great psychological fact, called by metaphysicians the 'duality of consciousness,' which means that in every act of thought there is intuitively presented the existence of the conscious subject, and the object of which he is conscious; or, in less technical and less correct language, the person thinking and the thing he is thinking about.

This is the first testimony of consciousness giving us the idea of ourselves, and what is not ourselves —the *ego* and the *non ego,* mind and matter, soul and body.

Here, then, are two apparently distinct facts of existence. Yet since men first turned their attention to the investigation of these facts, there has been an anxiety to explain the phenomena presented by one set of facts, by laws which are exclusively the attributes of the other.

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[3] *Lectures on Metaphysics.*

Yet all we know, all that is presented to us in an act of consciousness, is their *difference*. We only know Matter as the basis which, we are compelled to believe, exists for a certain set of attributes; and Mind as the basis to which appertain another set of attributes utterly and entirely distinct from the former.

For instance, as the attributes of Matter, there are hardness, softness, extension, colour, &c. Matter, then, may be defined as that which is hard, soft, extended, coloured. As the attributes of Mind, there are thought, sensation, volition; Mind, then, may be defined as that which thinks, perceives, wills. But, farther, we believe that the subject of these latter attributes—that which thinks, feels, wills—is one individual personality, which we call ourselves. As for the essence of Matter or of Mind, we have no *direct* knowledge; therefore to attempt to refer the attributes of one to either is simply nonsense; for we know nothing directly of either, apart from its special attributes. The only philosophical attempt would be to refer all the attributes of both matter and mind to some substance in which the coexistence of these attributes of Matter and Mind would not be incompatible. But such, from *the very nature of* things, or *from the constitution of our minds*, is simply unthinkable. Yet numerous have been the attempts of the most acute intellects to explain the phenomena of Mind by Material laws, and Matter by referring it to Mental acts. In different times, each theory had its supporters; the one, which would reduce all Intelligence to phases of Matter, and the other, which denied the objective existence of Matter altogether as anything other than modifications of Mind.

Both theories are equally absurd. All the knowledge we can have of either Mind or Matter is by their differences; we only *know* the one as the combination of attributes in every way opposed to those of the other.

Again, to quote Stewart, 'We have the same evidence for the existence of mind as we have for the existence of body; nay, if there be any difference between the two cases, we have stronger evidence for it, inasmuch as the one is suggested to us by the subjects of our own consciousness, the other merely by the objects of our perceptions; and in this light, undoubtedly, the fact would appear to every person, were it not that, from our earliest years, the attention is engrossed with the qualities and laws of matter, an acquaintance with which is absolutely necessary for the preservation of our animal existence.'

The reason here given by Stewart for the fact why, *contrary to the weight of evidence* (the testimony of the one witness, in the case—our own consciousness, being unimpeached), men were, and are, ready to not only admit as plausible, but even to accept as true, what is called Material philosophy, is not, I believe, the true one. This attention which material phenomena demand from our earliest years is the reason it is so difficult to realise to our minds the abstractions of Metaphysical inquiry; but it is no reason whatever why men who have been trained in the school of Philosophy should propound and insist upon a system which is unphilosophical and absurd.

We must look for some other reason why this theory, which aims at the abrogation of the intellectual principle in man, is so readily received. It is simply because it is only through the intellectual principle we can have any *rational* idea of God. It is only in the Principle of Causality, as given to us in an intuition of consciousness, that we obtain the notion of an intelligent First Cause of our own existence,—of a Creator. Without this, all our ideas of a creation rest on the veracity of the narrative of the Bible as a divine revelation.

Why, then, are men so desirous to overturn the basis of this conviction of creative power, as directly suggested in the human mind? Only because an idea of a Creator carries with it a notion of a sanction, and of a law. Law means restraint, in some sense or other; and there is in the human mind a sense of pain when subjected to restraint of any kind. Even the restraints self-imposed by society are irksome to individuals, even those which from their lesser importance do not deserve the name of laws. The customs of society, those of no necessity to man's happiness (except so far as conformity with the habits of his fellow-men may conduce to it), in many cases are irksome to individuals. It does not lessen, but increases, this sense of pain under restraint, that such restraint is the will of a superior Omnipotent Being, and that its sanctions are universal and inevitable.

Hence any theory which 'lays the flattering unction to the souls' of men that such sanctions do not, or may not, exist, is readily received. This is why Materialism, especially in the form of Atheism, has been put forward, and has had supporters other than those convinced of its truth. It was this rendered the philosophy of Voltaire so popular in France, and why it is still received in that country.

This is the reason *why men whose minds are used to metaphysical speculation*, and are therefore capable of realising in thought facts of Mental existence, deny the direct evidence of consciousness. But the reason why this evidence of consciousness is denied by others, *not so used to the investigation of Psychological phenomena*, depends on another cause. I have before alluded to the difficulty which, from the state in which we are placed, as obliged to ever have our attention continually drawn to Material objects, we find, in the first instance, to realise the difference between Mind and Matter, and the experience (which every one who has turned his mind to such facts *has*) of what time it requires before we can clearly and distinctly realise facts of Mental Science. The more we devote ourselves to the consideration of facts of Physical existence, the more difficult it becomes for us to realise in thought such ideas; until at last, after much advancement has been made in Physical Science, it becomes almost impossible for us ever to believe even in the existence of Mind and its attributes as distinct from Matter. This is the explanation of the antagonism between the sciences of mind and of matter, and therefore between Physical science and Religion; for as Religion depends on the assumption of the existence of a Spiritual Principle distinct from, and altogether unlike, anything of which we become cognisant in Material science, it will ever be on the side of those who hold the separate and distinct existence of Mind and its laws. For this reason, then, men of high intellectual attainments, in perfect good faith, find it difficult (as they say themselves,) to 'conceive' facts of Mental existence; but that is no reason why others may not clearly and distinctly realise such ideas, while those eminent observers of Physical phenomena, *from the nature of the objects which so generally occupy their minds*, are unable to do.

A consideration of the meaning of the word law, as applied to Mental and Material phenomena, is, I believe, the best means to enable us at first to conceive the distinction between the existences to which they are to be referred. For it is only with reference to the phenomena of our thinking faculties that the proper meaning of the word law, as a rule under which we *must* act, can truly be applied. As regards what are called the laws of the Material world, they are but a set of generalisations from experience of, as far as is yet ascertained, the uniformity of successions of certain events one to another. Gunpowder has always ignited when fire was applied to it. Water, in sufficient quantity, has always extinguished fire. But if I apply a light to gunpowder, I do not *know*, I only *believe*, from *experience*, that it will explode: it may or may not. If I throw water on a fire, I *believe* it will extinguish it; but I have no reason but former experience of such a result to make me believe that the effect, or rather that the consequence which has heretofore succeeded the act of throwing oil on a fire, may not occur in this case with water. Here, then, are two meanings of the word law as applied to Mental and Material phenomena—different according to the phenomena which they affect. As Mr. Mansel has well observed, the word law, having reference to Mental states or operations, has its primary meaning, viz. 'a rule under which one is compelled to act;' but, with regard to Material things, it has but a secondary meaning, no more than a universally-recognised state of facts.

As far as *compulsion* is an element of the idea of law, we can only have such with regard to laws which affect ourselves. We may see other objects acting in precisely the same order of antecedent and consequent; but whether this succession of events is necessary or not, we do not, and cannot, know.

Let us consider more carefully the meaning of this word law.

In its first and proper signification, it means a rule under which one *is compelled to* act. This meaning carries with it an idea of necessity; and, applied to the phenomena of Mind, necessity, in the strictest sense; a consciousness of something which we must do, or cannot do, whether we will or not. Now, suppose the case of a person so bound under such a law to act in a certain manner. All we are aware of is, that he *does* so act; but it is only himself who can *know* whether he is *compelled* to act so or not—whether any *necessity* exists for his so acting. It is therefore only with regard to the acts of our own consciousness, that we can tell whether they are performed under a law, in this sense of the word, or not. With reference to the acts of others, or the combinations of events in the world without us, we can only apply the word law in a sense transferred from its primary meaning; by a supposition that a like condition exists for others which we are conscious exists for us. Now, with regard to the phenomena of material objects, when we see them constantly occurring in one particular manner, we, by an analogy from what we *experience* ourselves when acting under a law, consider them as so compelled to act in this uniform manner, and call the fact of our having constantly observed them so acting *a law of nature.*

The law of gravitation, for instance, is only the statement that we *believe* all the particles of matter in the universe are *attracted* to each other in a certain and unvarying manner.

But all we *know* is, *that there is such a universally ascertained state of things* as this theory will account for, as far as we have any knowledge of the universe. We call this a law, because we represent to ourselves some supreme power commanding things so to be done, and that therefore they cannot occur otherwise. Now, if these different meanings of the word law as applied to the phenomena of Mind and Matter be correct, there must be a distinguishing characteristic presented to our minds by each, with regard to the manner in which these different laws are supposed to act.

The difference between Subjective or Mental laws, as distinguished from mere natural classifications of observed facts in nature, is thus stated by the author above quoted in these words:

'Setting aside for an instant the question how the mind of man is actually constituted, let us suppose an intelligent being, subject to laws under which he is compelled to think, and placed in the midst of a world of material agents, subject to laws under which they must act. What would be the distinctive character presented to his mind by these respective laws of himself and laws of the world without? The laws of the planetary motions are absolutely binding on the moving bodies themselves, independently of the existence of astronomical science. But it is optional with an intelligent being to study astronomy or not; and when he does so, he observes, as a matter of fact, how such laws influence their own subordinate agents; but he does not himself become an agent under their influence. As facts of his experience, they are known solely in and through his observation; as laws within their own sphere, they are independent of his knowing anything about them. But the laws of his mind come into operation as laws when the act of thinking commences, and are binding, not on this or that class of physical phenomena, but upon the thinker himself, in the contemplation of all of them. Hence it is not optional with him whether he will think according to these or other conditions; choose what object of study he will, he cannot think at all, he cannot conceive his liberty of choosing, without being, *ipso facto,* under its influence. Hence arises an obvious criterion. A law which is not binding upon me as a thinker may be at any time reversed, without affecting my mode of observing the same agents under their new conditions. And I have no difficulty in conceiving such a reversal as at any moment possible, because, antecedent to experience, I had no internal bias which required the recognition of the existing law rather than of any other. I have only to discard an adventitious knowledge. But the reversal of a necessary law of thought, supposing there are such, is, from the nature of the case, inconceivable; for conception is itself the servant of the law, and, *ex hypothesi*, cannot rebel against it.

'I cannot by an act of thought annihilate the conditions by which all thought is governed. I can, indeed, admit the possibility that there may be other beings thinking under other laws; but I can form no positive conception of their nature. Such a supposition is not thought, but its negation. A mind cannot think by other laws than its own.'[4]

The reason why we cannot conceive a different state of things from that which is the result of those mental laws by which our intellectual faculties are governed is here admirably pointed out.

I shall now proceed to state those laws of Mind

[4] *Prologomena Logica*, p. 90.

or Matter in the different senses of the word applicable to each as far as they have reference to the subjects which I propose to discuss. From the earliest times, philosophers, when considering, on the one hand, the different facts which characterised the various objects which surrounded them as compared with their own personal existence, on the other, had their attention more particularly directed to certain qualities or attributes, which seemed to be the *universal* and *necessary* concomitants of each as distinguished from the rest. With regard to the material world, they observed that although every material object differed from another, yet there were certain attributes which were common to all, and without which it was impossible even to have any conception of material existences, either as individuals or representatives of a class. These 'qualities' were called by Locke 'primary,' and thus described: 'Such as are utterly inseparable from the body in what estate soever it be, such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; *and such as the sense constantly finds in every particle of matter* which has bulk enough to be perceived, *and the Mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses.* . . . . These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us by solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.' Other attributes, which he calls secondary qualities, he thus describes: 'Such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, *i. e.* by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c.; these I call secondary qualities.'[5]

In this passage Locke has not distinctly stated the essential difference between these two kinds of ideas, though the doctrine afterwards to be evolved in the philosophy of Kant seems to be hinted at in the words: '*And the Mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly perceived by the senses.*' Here the *necessity* under which we find ourselves, both in *intuition* and *thought*, with reference to what Locke here calls *primary* qualities, is pointed out, which is the real and true distinction between these, and what he calls *secondary* qualities. The difference is this: there are a set of qualities or ideas without which we cannot either imagine or conceive anything material to exist, and there are others without which we can both imagine and conceive objects as existing. To illustrate this, I look round the room I am sitting in; I see the various objects by which I am surrounded—a table, chairs, fire, &c. All these objects have qualities which distinguish them from each other. The table is hard, the chair is soft, the fire is hot. These are the qualities in which they *differ*. But they all have some qualities in which they are alike, and which are common to all, *as far as I can think*, material objects in the universe.

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[5] *Essay on the Human Understanding*, book ii., cap. 8. sec. 9.

They possess various qualities, but they all possess qualities of some kind or other; in this they are alike: they have various shapes, but they all have a shape of some kind or other; in this they are alike. Farther, I find that I cannot conceive them as existing without these qualities which are common to all, viz. figure and substance.

For a long period in the history of Metaphysical investigation, it was thought that these attributes, which were called the *essential* qualities of objects, were actual entities which belonged to the objects themselves.

Now it is, I believe, admitted that these conditions, which we *believe* to be necessary (whether they are so or not), are only the conditions of the manner in which we *must* take recognisance of things, and the necessity which is thus suggested to us is a *subjective* not an *objective* fact. In other words, it is the conditions under which we are compelled to see things which make them appear in a certain *manner* to us. Though aware of the danger of illustrations from material facts, I think this may be exemplified by a person who was always accustomed to see things through coloured glass. He would think that the colour belonged to the objects, and was not the result of the manner in which they were made apparent to him. Thus, what we think are the *necessary attributes* of material objects are, in reality, *necessary conditions* under which we *must* be conscious of them. These laws of thought, under which we *must* think, if we think at all, are as follows:

Anything which we think of *as existing,* we must think of *as existing in some place.* Any attribute or quality which we imagine or *conceive,* we *must imagine or conceive as the property of some entity or substance.*

Any event which we think of *as occurring,* we must think of *as occurring in some period of duration, in some time.*

Moreover, when *we think,* or when we are conscious of any mental act, *we must* consider *ourselves* as so *thinking,* as so conscious, *distinct* from the phenomenon which is the matter of such mental act. It is to the German philosopher Kant, the Newton of Mental philosophy, that the merit of the discovery of the subjective character of these Mental laws is due.

Struck by the universal necessity which was the characteristic of these facts of intelligence, he classified them according as that necessity was more or less binding in each subject of intuition, conception, or imagination.

But for my purpose it is only necessary to state these laws or conditions under which our Mental acts must take place as matters of fact, and merely to distinguish them from those conditions which regulate the manner in which, through our senses, we become cognisant of external or material phenomena.

These laws or conditions of *Mind* to which I wish to draw attention, and to the exercise of which are attached the pleasures derived from the apperception or contemplation of certain objects without us, may be stated shortly as follows:

The condition Time, the condition Space, the condition Personal Identity.

The condition of Time means that our minds are so constructed that it is utterly impossible for us to consider any event as occurring other than in a relation to events which have preceded it, and to others which are to follow it. We must consider events as taking place in succession to others.

'This condition,' says Mansel, 'of *Time*, is that which governs, not merely our external perceptions, but our universal consciousness of all that takes place within or without ourselves. Every successive modification of the conscious mind can be made known to us only as a change of state; a change which is only possible under the condition of succession in Time, a transition from an earlier to a later phase of consciousness.'[6]

On this condition or law under which we are compelled to be conscious of every modification of our intellectual powers, whether by external perception or subjective states of sensibility, depend all our ideas of succession and duration.

On succession depends number, and it is by giving names to successive acts of consciousness that we construct the science of Arithmetic. And, as I believe, on this condition Time depends, in a great measure, the pleasure we derive from *Music, which consists in a great part in the recognition of certain periods of duration marked by certain sounds.*

On the mental law or condition Space depend all our ideas of proportion, and, for the most part,

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[6] *Prologomena Logica*, p. 120.

the pleasure we derive from Architecture, Painting, and Sculpture—in short, all our ideas of form and size.

But in the exercise of both these laws there is ever *the concomitant fact,* that in all the relations in which we become conscious of them, it is *we ourselves* whom they affect. In everything of which we become cognisant, by means of what has been called external perception, there is the feeling that it is *by us* it is perceived; in every modification of consciousness which we become aware of, the feeling is co-existent with such modification that it peculiarly belongs to ourselves. This intuition of *self-existence* which we are made aware of in every act of our intellectual faculties is called the principle of Personal Identity. To this being, which we call ourselves, we are *compelled to believe* belong all those facts of internal consciousness which we call intuitions, thoughts, imagination, memory, and also a certain set of states which have been called feelings, affections, desires, &c.—in fine, all those attributes which common language refers to the head or to the heart.

Here, then, we have arrived at the ultimate fact from which the Science of Mind begins. *This we positively and directly know*, that to us *belong* all the attributes which we call Mental. *This also we know*, that it is in our power to regulate and direct those Mental states of which we are conscious. Here, then, is the basis of the ideas of Substance and of Cause. Outside our consciousness such ideas are but supposed. *This, then, is our only knowledge; all else is belief.* But coexistent with this knowledge of ourselves, as beings to which these attributes belong, and as powers able to direct and modify our mental acts, *there arises a necessity to consider all other beings and all other things as in some manner like ourselves.*

We are led to consider external material attributes as, somehow or other, belonging to certain things, as our mental attributes, *we know*, belong to ourselves. We are led to *believe* that events *which we perceive as constantly linked together are connected as we and the modifications of our minds are—one as the cause of the other.* Here, then, are two other laws of thought suggested in the Principle of Personal Identity. On these two laws of *Substance* and of *Causality* depend all the motives which regulate our conduct with regard to the *material* universe, by which we find ourselves surrounded; nay, it is in accordance with these laws we regulate our actions as intellectual beings.

By one of them, the Principle of Causality, we are informed of, and impressed with, the idea of a Creator as a cause of our own existence. In our own consciousness we *know* of a cause, in the true sense of the word — *a power within us to change or modify the phenomena of our mental faculties.* Having, then, attained to this idea, we are *compelled* to believe that we ourselves have had a cause. This is the irresistible conviction forced upon us. Men may persuade others that they have persuaded themselves that they are not impressed with such a conviction; they never can persuade others that such a conviction is not present to their own minds.

In every act of consciousness we are assured that we ourselves must have had a cause, an agent possessing attributes not inferior to our own. Here we have the notion of an intellectual, personal cause possessing attributes like ourselves.

In the Material world around us we can find no such idea. It could never have given us the idea of an intelligent author of our being, and any attempt to form such an idea from the data so given must result in the gross conception of a Deity with human attributes; in Anthropomorphism.

But in the assurance which we have of a being with power to create us, all the attributes of such a being must be *superior* to those which characterise the created objects. A First Cause to us must be a cause in every way superior to what we are ourselves. Thus, referring again to the axiom that all knowledge comes by experience, we must necessarily, from our intellectual constitution, have of such a cause but an *inadequate* and *imperfect conception*, although of its existence we are perfectly certain. In Consciousness, then, only is given us the idea of a cause, of an intelligent agent capable of producing effects by an act of Will.

Compelled as we are to believe that this intelligent agent, which we find ourselves to be, must have had a cause, we must consider such a being as like in kind, but infinite and absolute.

Mr. Herbert Spencer is right when he says that 'the Power which the Universe manifests to us is inscrutable,' but he means the *Material* Universe. If he chooses to insist that we can have no experience of any cause but Physical causes, it is useless to argue farther. All his arguments are perfectly correct as applied to Material existences. 'Respecting the origin of the Universe,' he says, 'three verbally intelligent suppositions may be made. We may assert that it is self-existent, or that it is self-created, or that it is created by an external agency.'

'*We* may assert that *it*'—what do these words mean? Certainly that *we* are something different from *it*, about which we assert these suppositions. Let us apply his reasoning to the entity *we*, which he overlooks altogether in his argument, and substitute that word for the word 'universe;' thus, 'Respecting the origin of' *ourselves*, 'three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made. We may assert that *we* are self-existent, or that *we* are self-created, or that *we* are created by an external agency.' For the same reasons which Mr. Spencer applies to the Material universe, I, applying them to the Spiritual universe, reject the two former suppositions.

We are neither self-existent nor self-created. But here the parallel between Mind and Matter fails. 'The production of matter out of nothing,' says Mr. Spencer, 'is the real difficulty.' But he does not take into account an entity Mind with a set of attributes which gives us an *immediate* knowledge of an *intelligent effect-producing power*, which the observation of Material phenomena does not and cannot give us.

Again Mr. Spencer says:

'The objects and actions surrounding us, not less than the phenomena of our own consciousness, compel us to ask a cause; in our search for a cause we discover no resting-place until we arrive at the hypothesis of a First Cause: we have no alternative but to regard this First Cause as infinite and absolute.'

Here the ideas of Metaphysical and Physical causes are combined in one, But the two ideas here mixed up are in reality completely distinct, and both equally conceivable. The former, as I have so often defined it, is an antecedent with productive power, from which a consequent, called an effect, necessarily follows; and the latter is merely a constantly-observed invariable antecedent.

In the latter case, the universal belief of mankind is, that there is some connection between the two facts of antecedent and consequent—of what kind they know not—and here Mr. H. Spencer and his fellow Physiologists get the idea of an '*Unknowable Cause*' (which words, by the way, have no meaning[7]). In the former the students of Mental Science find the origin of the idea of a *Knowable* Cause *immediately* of ourselves, and *relatively and mediately of* the Material Universe around us.

Mr. Spencer compares the antagonism which he says exists between Religion and Science to the difference of opinion between the two knights in the fable, each of which saw but one side of a shield of different colour. I think this antagonism is rather between the students of Metaphysical and those of Physical Science. I believe that this is an instance of what I have before alluded to—that the concentration of the mind on the investigation of *Physical* phenomena, by those who devote themselves to such pursuits, unfits them for the process of thought necessary for Metaphysical speculation, and produces an inability to realise in thought the laws which regulate the phenomena of Mind. It has often been remarked that the difficulty which the student of Metaphysics has at first to overcome, with regard to the power of fixing in his mind clear ideas of the abstractions of that Science, is due to the fact that we have so much to do with Material existences of the world around us. How much more, then, must the difficulty be increased when the attention is wholly absorbed by Physical phenomena, so much so as to accumulate such a number of observed facts as make us wonder at the industry, not less than the powers of observation of such minds as Mr. Spencer's.

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[7] This word 'Unknowable' is an instance of what Mr. Huxley well describes as 'hypostatised adjectives, spelled with a capital letter for the same reason as we put bear-skin caps on our grenadiers—to make them look more ferocious than they are by nature.'

I am convinced *that it is not so much that the two sides of the shield are of different colours* as that even, when one of the knights has been persuaded to come over and look at the metaphysical side, it is found that, from *the intentness of his gaze on the side of Physical Science, he has been rendered colour-blind, and is incapable of realising the true colour even if he would.*

I believe that to this cause is due the intense bigotry which characterises the disciples of Natural Philosophy in their disputes with those who assert the existence of anything which comes not within the field of their investigations.

Thus, because Religion has its origin in the *known principles of the intellectual* part of our nature, when scientific men insist that there is nothing else but modifications of Matter in existence, or if there is, we can know nothing of such an entity but its *unknowableness*—then it is that Physical Science, because of the narrow views of its professors, comes into antagonism with Religion; and a reconciliation between them can only be brought about when the disciples of Material Philosophy realise the knowledge of all the facts of human nature; *when they admit the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, with reference to all the subjects of our experience of Mind and Matter.*

As has been shown before, that the word 'universe' means *Material* universe, so here the word 'Science' means *Material* Science. Surely, when Mr. Spencer speaks of the antagonism of Religion and Science, he means between certain persons who have devoted themselves to certain investigations in matters of Physical Science, and men who hold Religious beliefs. He would not say that every scientific man was, *ipso facto*, an irreligious man; certainly not men who were remarkable for their acquirements in Mental Science; nor can he even say that all men eminent in Physical discovery are irreligious. Mr. Mivart thus alludes to such unwarrantable assumptions:

'It may not be amiss here to protest against the intolerable assumption of a certain school, who are continually talking in lofty terms of "Science," but who actually speak of primary religious conceptions as "Unscientific," and habitually apply the word "Science" when they should limit it by the prefix "Physical." This is the more amazing, as not a few of this school adopt the idealist philosophy, and affirm that matter and force are but names for certain "modes of consciousness." It might be expected of them at least to admit that opinions which repose on primary and fundamental intuitions are especially and *par excellence* scientific.'[8]

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[8] The *Genesis of Species*, chap. xii. p. 251.

This is but another instance of how a devoted attention to the phenomena of the Material universe unfits the mind for the contemplation and realisation of Intellectual, and consequently Religious ideas. For this reason, what is really a peculiar characteristic of individuals is mistaken for an antagonism between two classes of facts of existence, equally known, and perfectly reconcilable each with the other; in fact, both part of one and the same system, and which may be 'traced up to the same general laws, and resolved into the same principles of divine conduct.'[9]

It is scarcely necessary for my purpose to enter into a discussion on this subject. I take for granted three ultimate laws as necessary conditions of all thought:

The laws of Time, of Space, and Personal Identity, and (as evolved by the latter) the laws of Substance and Causality.

These are common to all rational intelligence as far as we know; but besides these there are certain other intellectual conditions, which vary more or less in intensity in their effects on individual minds.

Appetites, passions, affections, are common to all men, but to each individual in greater or less degree;

[9] Bishop Butler.

and to the due proportion of each to the other and to the whole depends man's happiness or misery.

As I propose to investigate the basis of a certain degree of pleasure afforded to man by the manner in which he is constituted in relation to other beings, these affections, which in any way bear on the enjoyable emotions thus produced, must also be considered.

And farther, as even on account of *the manner in which our Senses are constructed,* a certain pleasure is afforded to us by the actual transmission of ideas, by our senses, to our minds, it will be also necessary for me to take into account how much of this pleasure is due to the *adaptation of our instraments of perception* to produce such results.

By such an investigation, I hope to show that there is a settled correlation between our intellectual faculties and outward external objects which contributes to our happiness as human beings, in a great and positive degree. Such a fact is, I believe, evidence of design, of benevolent design in the constitution of things.

For those who deny the existence of a Creator, of course such evidence of design has no existence; but I assume an intelligent cause of all things because such an idea is given me in my own consciousness.

If any person say that such an idea is not presented to him as it is to me, I can only say I do not believe him. I do not believe that any person has ever convinced *himself* of the truth of Atheism. Many have *said*, and do *say*, they have so convinced themselves, and possibly have convinced others, that such is the truth, as a fact of their own mental phenomena; but such is not the truth for them, neither is it for their ignorant dupes, who are led to believe that their inability to think the same, is a proof of the superior intellectual organisation of these so-called philosophers.[10]

In the present age, nothing goes down so well with the half-educated classes than what they believe to be a new and most profound theory, that of entire Scepticism. But in reality there is no older, safer, or simpler philosophy, than that of a person who denies that he knows anything, even his own existence. It is utterly impossible to argue with him, because he denies that there exists the basis of an argument. If he has only the impudence to assert that he differs from his opponent, by not having presented to him in consciousness those facts which the *languages* and the *actions* of the rest of mankind lead us to suppose they have, and which I myself am directly conscious of, viz. the intuitions, for instance, of *Personal Identity, and Power to direct the modifications of my own mind,* the only answer that can be given is, that either his intellectual organisation differs from the rest of mankind, or that he is stating what is not true. I have no hesitation in adopting the latter explanation; and instead of considering these philosophers as rare specimens of human animals, and above vulgar prejudices, I rather choose to believe them individuals of a class unhappily not at all rare—men who sacrifice truth to personal advantage.

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[10] 'The fool hath said in his heart there is no God.'

With regard to those who deny all knowledge even of their own existence, there seems to me to be this fallacy. They say, 'May not the waking thought be itself a dream?' So far no person can confute such an assertion. But it is perfectly absurd to say that this asserts *the non-existence of the individual.* In dreams, as in what we call waking thoughts, the consciousness of personal self-existence is as present in one state as in the other. Nay, in a dream, as a fact of experience, the consciousness of self is always even more forced on our minds than in what we call waking states, and even of our *corporeal organisation* as belonging to this self.

In a nightmare, *I* am not only terrified at the thought of falling over a precipice, but am conscious



CHAPTER I.

THE EMOTION PRODUCED BY THE SUBLIME.

If we consider what we experience when affected by the Sublime, we shall find that it is a recognition of a power compared with which we are conscious of our own inferiority.

A consciousness, then, of our own littleness seems to be the emotion produced by the apperception of the Sublime.

Burke refers the passion produced by the Sublime to fear or terror. He says: 'Indeed, terror is in all cases what seems, either more openly or latently, the ruling principle of the Sublime.' That this is not the fact—that we may at the same time be astonished and pleased by the contemplation of the Sublime, without the least degree of terror—I think will appear to any person who considers the effect produced the apperception of the Sublime in Art.

[illegible] doubt in most cases, when affected by the re[illegible]o of the Subli[illegible]re, we do feel some degree of fear; but this I think arises from the intense feeling of our inability to control the agencies apparent in Physical phenomena, which reflectively produces in us a feeling of terror, the effect of this idea of our own helplessness. But Burke scarcely speaks at all of the idea of the Sublime in Art; almost all his illustrations are taken from natural objects, or from *descriptions* of natural objects which inspire this passion.[1]

Yet that the idea of power is a necessary part of the emotion of the Sublime, he admits, for he says:

'Besides these things which directly suggest the idea of danger, and those which produce a similar effect from a mechanical cause, I know of nothing sublime which is not a modification of power.' And again: 'Now, as power is undoubtedly a capital source of the Sublime, this will point out evidently whence its energy is derived, and to what class we ought to unite it.'

A perception of Power, then, being the source of the Sublime, it remains to trace this idea of Power to its origin. In the Introduction I have referred it to a spontaneous intuition of the intellect, given in the exercise of our will on the modifications of our mental states.

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[1] Here I would be understood by the Sublime in Art to mean, not the imitation of the Sublime in Nature in the productions of Art, but that which has no prototype in Nature, that which is the production of the Mind alone.

That such an idea as that of productive power is thus given has been denied, and all sorts of theories are suggested to explain its origin. No one can deny that we can and do experience such an idea; but where it has come from, how we got it, is the difficulty to be solved.

The question at issue is, as to the psychological origin of the idea of power as an element in the relation of Cause and Effect. One late writer, Mr. Mill, following Hume, denies altogether the notion of productive power in causation, and refers its origin to 'a tendency in the infancy of the human mind.' What that 'tendency in the infancy of the human mind'—which I suppose he would assert, vanishes when the human mind arrives at full vigour—is to be in the first instance referred to, or where it comes from, Mr. Mill does not say.

On the other hand, Locke, Kant, Cousin, Sir W. Hamilton, and Mr. Mansel, with many others, hold—though arriving differently at the same conclusion—that this notion of productive power is an element suggested by the intelligence when experience has supplied us with the relation of antecedent and consequent. To speak more generally, and without reference to the opinion of any of these authors, I believe they would all agree that our first idea of power is developed in the relation of Cause and Effect, between our volitions and our acts. That we thus get the idea of power Mr. Mill denies, and seems to wish to deny the existence of the idea altogether.

Here I will not enter on an argument to prove the existence of such an idea, still less its origin. As I before stated, I believe it to be useless to endeavour to prove what only the experience of each individual can make known to him.

No amount of arguments can prove to a man blind from his birth that red is different from white, or even to a man who *says* he can see no difference between what we call red and what we call white.

If a man says he has not the idea of productive power given him in his intellectual acts, we cannot persuade him to admit he has; but as the author referred to, in his popular work on Logic, has so incorrectly stated the theory which I advocate, and which he calls the Volitional theory, I think it necessary to point out, how entirely different the theory which finds the origin of the idea of causative power in the human mind is, from that which he represents it to be.

Mr. Mill's statement is as follows: 'It is proper in this place to advert to a rather ancient doctrine respecting Causation, which has been revived during the last few years in several quarters, and at present gives more signs of life than any other theory of Causation at variance with that set forth in the preceding pages.

'According to the theory in question, Mind, or, to speak more precisely, Will is the only cause of phenomena. The type of Causation, as well as the exclusive source from which we derive the idea, is our own voluntary agency. Here, and here only, it is said, have we any direct evidence of Causation.

'We know that we can move our bodies. Respecting the phenomena of inanimate nature, we have no other direct knowledge than that of antecedence and sequence.

'But in the case of our voluntary actions, it is affirmed that we are conscious of power before we have experience of results. An act of volition, whether followed by an effect or not, is accompanied by a consciousness of effort, of force exerted, of power in action, which is necessarily causal or causative.

'This feeling of energy, of force, inherent in an act of will, is knowledge *a priori;* an assurance prior to experience that we have the power of causing effects.

'Volition therefore, it is asserted, is something more than an unconditional antecedent; it is a cause, in a different sense from that in which physical phenomena are said to cause one another; it is an Efficient Cause. From this the transition is easy to the further doctrine that Volition is the *sole* Efficient Cause of all Phenomena.'[2]

Certainly Mr. Mill could never have read the works of M. Cousin, if he intends the foregoing for a true statement of what he calls the Volitional theory of Causation.

'*Here, and here only, it is said, we have direct evidence of Causation.*'

'*We know that we can move our bodies.*'

Is it possible that Mr. Mill does not know that the theory of Maine de Biran, that the origin of the idea of Cause is developed in the relation between our will and our bodily actions, has been shown by M. Cousin to be fallacious, and that the Volitional theory is that this idea of power is got only *from will acting on the modifications of mind,* not of our bodies.

One passage (quoted by Mr. Mansel from M. Cousin) will be sufficient to show this:

'Cherche-t-on la notion de cause dans l'action de la bille sur la bille, comme on le faisait avant

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[2] *System of Logic*, p. 382.

Hume, ou de la main sur la bille et de premiers muscles locomoteurs sur leur extrémités, ou même dans l'action de la volonté sur le muscle, comme l'a fait M. de Biran, ou ne la trouvera dans aucun des ces cas, pas même dans le dernier, car il est possible qu'il y ait une paralysie des muscles qui rende la volonté impuissante sur eux improductive, incapable d'être cause, et par consequent d'en suggerer la notion. Mais ce qu'aucune paralysie ne peut empêcher, c'est l'action de la volonté sur elle-même, la production d'une résolution, c'est à dire une causation toute spirituelle, type primatif de la causalité, dont toutes les actions extérieures, à commencer par l'effort musculaire, et à finir par le mouvement de la bille sur la bille, ne sont que de symboles plus ou moins infidèles.'[3]

Here we have, summed up, the arguments which Cousin uses against the theory of Maine de Biran concerning the origin of our ideas of Cause and Effect. Here it is shown that all Mr. Mill argues for has been assented to, by those who hold the Volitional theory, viz. that the connection between our will and our bodily actions is only a case of Physical Causation; but it is in the action of the will in directing the train of our ideas that we find the true notion of a cause; that is, of an antecedent governing a consequent by an element of productive power. I find I can direct my thoughts, that is, the action of my mental states, to this or that matter; I can, by an effort of intellectual power, recall a train of ideas I had yesterday—I can retain them or dismiss them.

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[3] *Fragments Philosophiques*, préface de la première édition.

Here are *effects* in the true sense, results of an antecedent *cause, produced* by it. But of this latter theory of Causation, which so accounts for the origin of our ideas of Cause and Effect, Mr. Mill is, or pretends to be, entirely ignorant; for he goes on to argue against the former theory, as if Cousin had not, in his criticism of the theory of Maine de Biran, exposed its fallacy. But let us follow his arguments farther. After having put forward the above as a fair statement of the Volitional theory, he goes on to say:

'From this the transition is easy to the farther doctrine, that Volition is the sole efficient Cause of all Phenomena. It is inconceivable that dead force could continue unsupported for a moment beyond its creation.

'We cannot even conceive of change or phenomena without the energy of a mind.

'The word *action* itself,' says another writer of the same school, 'has no real significance except when applied to the doings of an intelligent agent. Let any one conceive, if he can, of any power, energy, or force inherent in a lump of matter.

'Phenomena may have the semblance of being produced by physical causes, but they are in reality produced, say these writers, by the immediate agency of mind. All things which do not proceed from a human (or I suppose an animal) will proceed, they say, directly from divine will. 'The earth is not moved by the combination of a centripetal and a projectile force; this is but a mode of speaking which serves to facilitate our conceptions. It is moved by the direct volition of an omnipotent being, in a path coinciding with that which we deduce from the hypothesis of these two forces.'[4]

But in these quotations all that is stated is merely what we can conceive, or what we cannot conceive, with regard to *Matter*. But certainly they do not warrant the assertion that these authors believed that 'phenomena are in reality produced by the *immediate* agency of Mind' or the '*direct* volition of an omnipotent being.' And even if these authors held the doctrine of Occasional Causes, Mr. Mill cannot but be aware that very few of any modern authors hold it, and that it is not a fair representation of the

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[4] *System of Logic*, p. 382.

Volitional theory to describe it as resulting in this doctrine. Leibnitz rejected this scheme long since as unphilosophical, and reproached those who held it as degrading the Divinity by making Him act like a watchmaker, who, having constructed a timepiece, would still be obliged himself to turn the hands to make it mark the hours. I doubt very much whether any author holds it now; but certainly there are several authors who hold the Volitional theory of Causation, to describe the opinions of whom, by the doctrine which Mr. Mill has here stated, is manifestly unjust.

To use Mr. Mill's own words, 'a more outrageous stretch of inference could hardly be made.'

Further on he again states, 'that *these writers*' say that 'since we know of no other efficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence, there is no other, and volition is the *direct* cause of all phenomena.'

He seems unable to distinguish between the fact of volition being the *efficient cause* of all phenomena, and its being the *immediate* and *direct* cause from which every effect *directly* comes.

Though the Divinity is the efficient cause of all things, that does not mean that He is the *immediate* and *direct* cause.

'When men,' says Butler, 'confess that God is the natural governor of the world, they must not deny this again because His government is uniform, that He does things at all because He does them constantly, because the effects of His acting are permanent whether his acting be so or not.'

Mr. Mill's argument, then, against the Volitional theory, which deduces our first and only notion of productive power or Causation, or energy, from Mind, depends, as I have shown, on a distorted and unfair statement of what that theory is.

He sets out as a statement of this theory that of Maine de Biran, which has been overturned by Cousin; and further, he gives what he considers as the result which must necessarily follow from that theory, and which is neither more nor less than the doctrine of Occasional Causes of Malebranche. Having thus, as he imagines, reduced the Volitional theory to an absurdity, he triumphantly overthrows what, in reality, is his own work, and not that of his opponents.

I have devoted so much time to the consideration of Mr. Mill's argument, as I consider him the representative of the modern school of sceptical philosophers, who, wanting the courage of Hume boldly to avow their opinions, endeavour to convey in their arguments theories which are quite as subversive of all Religious belief as his. And as this method is more safe for the philosophers, so it is more dangerous for their disciples; for when vicious arguments are stated openly, the absurdity of them is the antidote to the evil effects they might produce; but when premises only are put forth, and the conclusions left to be drawn from them by uneducated people, the chances are that they will arrive at conclusions perhaps different from what was intended; at all events, far different from what modern sceptics would wish to be thought to be the conclusions which they meant should follow.

So far I have been only endeavouring to prove a negative; but if the foregoing arguments are correct, they show that the Volitional theory as to the origin of our ideas of Cause and Effect has not yet been overthrown.

I am justified, then, for the present, in assuming that the idea of power has it's origin in the relation between our Volitions and our Mental acts. I have now to refer the passion caused by the Sublime to this source.

I hope to be able to show that the perception of the Sublime in natural objects consists in a recognition of a power which we are unable to resist, and that the Sublime in Art consists in the recognition of the existence of a Mind, of a Will, of an Intellectual Power, in other beings of our Species, like but superior to our own, to which we refer works of Art as *Effects* to their *Cause*.

In the first place, all our ideas of power come from the intuitions given in the act of Volition, when we consciously direct our Mental states, this being the only way in which we can realise such an idea. With regard to all other phenomena which take place independently of our Volition, we get the idea of *inability* or *powerlessness*. When we have got such a *negative* idea, we commonly make it *positive* by transferring the positive idea of power to the phenomena which we find ourselves unable to control, and call what is in reality but our own *want of power*, power, or force, in inanimate matter.

When we speak of the irresistible power of an avalanche, we only mean *irresistible* by all the means we can bring to bear to arrest its course.

When we speak of the immense power of water in motion, we only mean *our own inability* to resist it.

Our own power, then, is the standard to which we refer all our ideas on the subject.

Thus we have two ideas of power: we may call them positive and negative.

The one is given in the exercise of our own Volition on our Mental acts; our Consciousness that in every act of Volition it is in our power to form the resolution or to abstain, such being the presentative fact of Free Will; and the other, this idea of power transferred to other objects.

On the former depends more immediately the emotion caused by the apperception of the Sublime in Art: on the latter, that produced by the cognition of the Sublime in natural objects. Both depend ultimately on our consciousness of Mental power.

The source of the emotion of the Sublime, then, is *our consciousness of Mind as a Cause.*

To prove these assertions, I can only have recourse to instances in which, I suppose, every individual of the human species experiences acts of consciousness as I do.

I have said that Burke traces one source of the Sublime to a modification of power, which he says arises from terror, 'the common stock of everything which is sublime.'

On the other hand, if the foregoing analysis of the intellectual phenomena be correct, the emotion of the Sublime depends for its origin on the presentation of the intuition of power, which intuition is given immediately in consciousness. That terror *accompanies* the emotion of the Sublime, produced by the cognition of objects in *Nature*, cannot be denied. But because this feeling of terror is the concomitant of such ideas, it is not the cause of them, as Burke states. I shall take, as an instance, the illustration he brings forward, from the consideration of which I think it will be evident that terror is not the source of the Sublime.

He says: 'There are many animals who, though far from being large, are yet capable of raising ideas of the Sublime, because they are considered objects of terror, as serpents and poisonous objects of almost all kinds.' Without another quotation, this, the first example he adduces to prove his position, proves nothing of the kind.

Let us consider his argument. His statement is, that whatever is terrible is sublime. 'Whatever is terrible with regard to sight is sublime too.' 'It is impossible to look on anything as trifling or contemptible that may be dangerous.' To refute this proposition, I deny that serpents or poisonous animals raise ideas of the Sublime. The sight of such animals raises a feeling of loathing and disgust. The idea of danger has not much to do with this feeling; for were we perfectly assured of the harmlessness of serpents, this feeling would still remain; and moreover, we experience the same feeling with regard to frogs, beetles, and other animals, which we know to be perfectly harmless, and which certainly do not inspire us with ideas of Sublimity.

The next example is that of the emotion produced by the sight of the ocean. No doubt there is a feeling of terror produced by the sight of the ocean when, agitated by a storm, it dashes with fury on the coast; but this on consideration will, I think, be found to be attributable to the idea of the force or power of the waves compared with our individual strength—a comparison which is so well expressed in the well-known lines of Byron:

'Roll on, thou deep and dark blue ocean, roll;
Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain.
Man marks the earth with ruin; his control
Stops with thy shore. Upon thy watery plain
The wrecks are all thy deed, nor doth remain
A shadow of man's ravage, save his own,
When for a moment, like a drop of rain,
He sinks into thy depths with bubbling groan,
Without a grave, unknell'd, uncoffin'd, and unknown.

His steps are not upon thy paths; thy fields
Are not a spoil for him; thou dost arise
And shake him from thee; the vile strength he wields
For earth's destruction thou dost all despise,
Spurning him from thy bosom to the skies,
And sends him, shivering in thy playful spray,
And howling to his gods, where haply lies
His petty hope in some near port or bay,
And dashest him again to earth—there let him lay.

The armaments which thunder-strike the walls
 Of rock-built cities, bidding nations quake,
And monarchs tremble in their capitals;
 The oak leviathans, whose huge ribs make
Their clay creator the vain title take
 Of lord of thee, and arbiter of war:
These are thy toys; and as the snowy flake
 They melt into thy yeast of waves, which mar
Alike the Armada's pride and spoils of Trafalgar.

Thy shores are empires, changed in all save thee:
 Assyria, Greece, Rome, Carthage, where are they?
Thy waters wasted them while they were free,
 And many a tyrant since; their shores obey
The stranger, slave, or savage; their decay
 Has dried up realms to deserts; not so thou,
Unchangeable save to thy wild waves' play.
 Time writes no wrinkle on thine azure brow:
Such as creation's dawn beheld thou rollest now.'

In these lines the emotions inspired by the spectacle of the ocean are vividly described. Descriptive poetry aims at reproducing ideas which have been before suggested to the mind, and which produced emotions of the Beautiful or Sublime; and in order to be successful, it is necessary that it should accurately convey the train of ideas which produced the emotion in the first instance.

In the passage above quoted, the process of mind which evokes the feeling of the Sublime, when produced by the contemplation of *Natural objects,* is accurately followed. In each stanza a *comparison is made between the overwhelming power* of the ocean and man's *littleness.*

In the first and second stanza, man himself is compared with the ocean.

'The vile strength' of man for earth's destruction is brought into contrast with the power which spurns him from its bosom and dashes him again to earth; but in the third, those works of man which seem the most sublime, such as ships of war, which make mankind great in battle, and even give him the title of master of the sea, are characterised as toys which melt into the yeast of waves.

In the fourth, the comparison culminates in the allusion to the unchangeableness and apparent insensibility to the effects of *Time;* the attributes of the ocean with the evanescent character of the most lasting monuments of human labour.

Of all the facts which are the special attributes of our animal existence, there is none which conveys such an idea of our insignificance as creatures, as the strict necessity which we are under with regard to Time.

Whenever we would try to conceive ourselves as superior to other animals, in this we must feel that we are but equal to them. When we consider that we cannot protract our animal existence longer than at most a miserable hundred years, all our pride seems presumption. In this respect, indeed, we are in the 'iron grasp of necessity;' and the poet, when he wanted to express the difference between man's power and that of nature, could not better do so than by indirectly alluding to the short span of human life, and contrasting the unchangeableness of the ocean in this the finest line in all his works:

> 'Time writes no wrinkle on thine azure brow.'

The sight of lofty mountains produces an idea of the Sublime in a high degree.

Here again it is the consideration of that *inefficiency of our power* as animals which causes this emotion. The sight of a precipice three hundred feet high gives us a greater notion of Sublimity than the sight of a mountain ten times that height which rises in a slope; and the more inaccessible or the more the precipice leans forward, the greater the effect produced, and in the opposite degree, the more it recedes from the perpendicular. But that which produces in us the highest notion of Sublimity is the spectacle of the heavens on a starry night; and I think a due consideration of how we experience that emotion will go further to confirm my views on this subject. I believe that such a sight does not convey such an overpowering sense of grandeur to some as to others.

To an ignorant man, who knows not how far what he calls the sky is from him, who has no knowledge of the vast depth of the ethereal space above him, but believes, with the first astronomers, that it is a solid sphere studded with stars of comparatively small size, such a sight does not convey any very great idea of the Sublime.

To one who has even a limited knowledge of the principles of astronomy, who knows that almost every star he sees is a sun, the centre of a system like our own, and round which immense bodies revolve in perpetual harmony, the contemplation of the heavens is indeed Sublime.

But the man who has devoted his attention to the study of the stupendous machinery of the stellar universe, who has learned the admirable arrangement of systems on systems, ever revolving through space, who has been taught that man's furthest efforts to sound the depths of that space only show him its infinity, who has tried to grasp in thought the distances, the velocities, the magnitudes, which are the units in that mighty system, he truly is impressed with the Sublime in—

> 'this display,
> This ostentation of creative power.'

The study of astronomy as the most sublime exercise of the human intellect is well described in the following lines :

'How rich the prospect, and for ever new,
And newest to the man who views it most!
For newer still in infinite succeeds.
Then these aerial racers, O how swift!
How the shaft loiters from the strongest string!
Spirit alone can distance the career;
Orb above orb ascending without end,
Circle in circle without end enclosed,
Wheel within wheel, Ezekiel! like to thine,
Like thine it seems a vision or a dream.
Though seen, we labour to believe it true:
What involution, what extent, what swarms
Of worlds that laugh at earth, immensely great,
Immensely distant from each other's spheres!
What, then, the wondrous space through which they roll!
At once it quite engulfs the human thought—
'Tis comprehension's absolute defeat.'

The study of astronomy even in a *popular* manner gives us the most impressive notion of the Sublime, because by contrasting the immense forces apparent in the motion of the heavenly bodies with our own powers, it gives us a relative idea of our insignificance as creatures, and also reveals to us design and intelligence in the structure of the universe.

In the investigations of astronomers every discovery leads to the conclusion of a *first intelligent Cause.*

'If there be anything,' says a modern author,[4] 'which can lead the mind up to the Omnipotent Ruler of the universe, and give to it an approximate knowledge of His attributes, it is to be found in the grandeur and beauty of His works. If you would know His *glory*, examine the interminable range of suns and systems which crowd the Milky Way. Multiply the hundred millions of stars which belong to our own island universe by thousands of those astral systems that exist in space, within the range of human vision, and then you may form some idea of the infinitude of His kingdom; for lo! these are but a part of his ways.

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[4] The *Orbs of Heaven*, by O. M. Michill.

'Examine the scale on which the universe is built; comprehend if you can the vast dimensions of *our* sun; stretch outward through His system, from planet to planet, and circumscribe the whole within the immense circumference of Neptune's orbit. This is but a single unit out of the myriads of similar systems. Take the wings of light, and flash with impetuous speed away, day and night, and month and year, till youth shall wear away and middle age is gone, and the extreme limit of human age has been attained; count every pulse, at each speed on your way, one hundred thousand miles, and when a hundred years have rolled by look out, and behold! the thronging millions of blazing suns are still around you, each separated from the other by such a distance that in this journey of a century you have only left half a score behind you.

'Would you gather some idea of the eternity past, of God's existence?

'Go to the astronomer, and bid him lead you with him in one of his walks through space; and as he sweeps onward from object to object, from universe to universe, remember that the light from those filmy stains on the deep pure blue of heaven now falling on your eye has been traversing space for a million of years. Would you gather some knowledge of the omnipotence of God? Weigh the earth on which we dwell, then count the millions of its inhabitants that have come and gone for the last six thousand years; unite their strength into one arm, and test its power in an effort to move this earth. It could not move it a single foot in a thousand years, and yet under the omnipotent hand of God not a minute passes that it does not fly more than a thousand miles. But it is a mere atom, the most insignificant point amongst His innumerable worlds.

'At His bidding every planet and satellite and comet, and the sun itself, fly onward in their appointed courses. His single arm guides the millions of sweeping suns, and round His throne circles the great constellation of unnumbered universes.

'Would you comprehend the idea of the omniscience of God? Remember that the highest pinnacle of knowledge reached by the whole human race, by the combined efforts of its highest intellect, has enabled the astronomer to compute *approximately* the perturbations of the planetary worlds. He has predicted roughly the return of half a score of comets. But God has computed the mutual perturbations of millions of suns and planets and comets and worlds without number, through the ages which are past, and through the ages which are yet to come, not approximately, but with perfect and absolute precision. The universe is in motion, system rising above system, clüster above cluster, nebula above nebula, all majestically sweeping around under the Providence of God, who alone knows the end from the beginning, and before whose glory and power all intelligent beings, whether in heaven or on earth, should bow with humility and awe.'

I have quoted this passage at length because I believe that in it are conveyed the most Sublime ideas which can be presented to the Human Mind. As in the other instances, these ideas arise from a comparison of the puny helplessness of man with the stupendous works with which he is surrounded. In the contemplation of the majestic machinery of the universe, and of the scale on which it is designed, we are brought in direct mental contact with facts which, from their immensity, we are unable to realise even in imagination.

We become cognisant of phenomena, *the results of intelligence like our own in character, but infinitely superior in power;* and it is through such contemplation of the works that our unassisted reason can rise to an approximate idea of the infinite attributes of the Creator. We know the existence of a God as an intelligent antecedent Cause to ourselves as intelligent causes; but the attributes *which reason dictates to us to assign to such a Cause are verified in the contemplation of the universe by which we are surrounded.* Thus the knowledge of a God is given us immediately, as all our ideas of the Sublime are given us, in the notion of *Causative power* developed in the exercise of our Mental faculties; and astronomy is the most Sublime Science to which the mind of man can be directed, because in that study we are continually contemplating the superior works of a superior intelligence.

The study of astronomy therefore cannot but tend to produce in us feelings of humility and awe, and lead us to the knowledge of what an insignificant position we hold in the scale of creation. Astronomy therefore is the only branch of *Physical* investigation, the study of which does not produce in a very great degree the effect of rendering the mind unfit for the prosecution of Psychological Science. It has even been considered to produce a contrary effect, and tend to foster the Religious feelings; while, on the other hand, the examination of the works of the Creator *below us* in the scale of Material organisation produces in us a contrary effect, as a traveller in a strange country, who devotes his attention to the flowers beneath his feet, misses the beauties of the landscape which surrounds him. Thus far I have considered the emotion of the Sublime as excited by the apperception of Natural objects. I have now to consider this emotion with reference to objects which are the results of human labour, Mental and Physical. There are indeed very few Material objects the products of Art which *directly from themselves* impress us with an idea of Sublimity. It is only by a reflective consideration of the superiority of the intellect which conceived the idea of them in the first instance, that we are inspired with such an emotion. But there is one science the results produced by which directly excite in our minds an idea of the Sublime—the science of Engineering—because by its means the works of man are put into direct and *successful* antagonism with the forces apparent in nature.

By the appearance of superiority in such works over the natural forces of matter, we refer this effect immediately to its cause—Mental Power. As the contemplation of the inferiority of human power to control the forces inherent in nature impresses us with a feeling of helplessness, so when we see the results of man's intellect and labour *successfully* opposing these forces, we obtain the positive idea of human power. As an instance, the sight of the Britannia bridge over the Menai Straits produces in our minds, in a very great degree, the emotion of the Sublime. Standing under it when the tide is running out quickly, and observing how the current rushes against the magnificent piers which support the tubes, and observing how in impassive grandeur it seems to stand, regardless of the action of the elements; one must be unimpressionable indeed if he does not experience very strongly an idea of Sublimity, not only from the magnitude of the structure itself, but reflectively from a reference to the *intellectual power as a cause* which first conceived the idea, and carried into effect, such a triumph of Mind over Matter. The contemplation of a breakwater during a storm, for the same reason, because it seems thereby that man dictates to the waves how far they shall come and no farther, creates in our minds the same emotions. This Science, which enables man to conquer natural obstacles to his progress, is the only one the results of which *directly* and *immediately* produce in the mind the idea of the Sublime. By its aid man crosses seas and passes through mountains, which are the Material barriers to his progress from one part of this planet, of which he is the inhabitant, to another. Farther, it enables him, in a certain degree, to overcome the restrictions *in relation to time and space* which are imposed on him by the laws of the material phenomena by which he is surrounded, as an animal endowed with specially restricted means of locomotion.

By this means, Mind seems enabled to so far conquer Material restrictions, and assert in such results, in however small a degree, its own peculiar characteristics.

I shall now proceed to consider each of the Fine Arts in themselves, as they depend for the emotions of the Beautiful or Sublime on the Psychological or Physical conditions of the human constitution.

CHAPTER II.

SCULPTURE.

I SHALL commence the endeavour to trace the principles in our Mental constitution on which depends the pleasure we derive from the apperception of the Beautiful and Sublime, by a consideration of the manner in which these attributes, as evident in the results of the Sculptor's Art, affect us; because in that branch of the Fine Arts the emotions so excited rest on a more purely intellectual basis than in any of the others.

All the pleasure we derive from the contemplation of the recognised effects of Mental labour, as displayed in artistic works, of course in the first instance has its origin in the intellectual part of our nature; but in some instances, more or less tinctured, so to speak, by the result of appeals to other feelings, which we regard as of less dignity than those conditions which we are led to consider as the special characteristics of a purely intellectual state of existence.

Thus the Sculptor's Art, as far as it aims at representing *form*, which is mere bounded extension, depends entirely for its apperception on a Psychological Principle of our nature—the Mental condition *Space*.

Sculpture is essentially an imitative art. Its object is the representation of the form of objects without us, and in its highest results the representation, by and through the external animal form of man, of the expression of the intelligence within him, which modifies by its action this external form.

To amplify this general description of the art, it is necessary to class the object produced by it in two divisions:

1st. Those which are representations of either the human form, or other forms supposed to be endowed with an intellectual principle; and,

2nd. Those which are mere representations of material objects, or animals not possessing mental intelligence.

With reference to the latter branch of the art, I do not intend to treat, as I regard it as more or less but a mechanical representation of objects as they exist in nature, and only in a lesser degree capable of exciting those emotions which I have undertaken to analyse.

Such works are called *clever* in contradistinction to those of higher merit. But it is with regard to those works which *exhibit* in them the effort and *intention* of the artist *to represent Matter* as it is modified by Mind, which represent Mental states or conditions as evinced by external expression, that I have here to consider.

A very slight consideration will convince any one that any work of Sculpture can have merit (in this sense) only as far as the intention of the artist to convey the expression meant is well or ill carried out.

Without such an effect the most faithful copy of the physical form of humanity is merely a *clever* anatomical study, and as little calculated to produce ideas of Beauty or Sublimity as a wax model in a surgical museum.

And this expression must not only be exhibited in the form of the features of the face alone; the rest of the body, so far as the exterior form is displayed, must harmonise as far as is possible with it.

What produces the effect which we call perfection in a statue or group is the perfect accordance of all the parts to the general idea which the artist proposed to exhibit when he first conceived the idea of the work. Now there are but three ways in which we can become acquainted with ideas in the mind of another, viz. by words, by signs, or by the expression.

By words I would comprehend all sounds used to convey ideas from one intelligence to another; by signs, all symbols which may be so used; and by expression, all dispositions of the features or physical form which convey any idea which is present to the mind of one intellectual being to that of another.

To represent this last mode of manifesting ideas or emotions is the object of the Sculptor's Art in its highest phase.

To define it as far as it relates to the formation of objects calculated to inspire the beholder with ennobling feelings, *it is the art of exhibiting peculiar modifications in the outward appearance of the human form, of which the presence of certain ideas in the mind are the supposed and recognised cause.*

The special characteristic of this means of communicating ideas from one mind to another is the rapidity with which they are conveyed.

A look, or a gesture, can convey ideas much more quickly and in a more impressive manner than signs or words.

For this reason then, that expression effects its object, of conveying the notion which it represents almost instantaneously, such notion, is presented much more vividly than by any other means.

But the emotions thus conveyed must be strong to produce a sufficiently marked effect on the physical formation; and in proportion as they effect the mind of the subject, so much the more vivid effect they produce through the expression on the objective intellect.

This is why that a play read never can produce the vivid effect on our minds as the same work represented by actors on the stage. No doubt the ideas which we obtain from the perusal of a dramatic work in the library may be very different from those which are presented to us in the theatre, for the actors may, rightly or wrongly, conceive different opinions from ours of the parts which they play; but I am here speaking only of the effect produced, for besides the words which we *hear*, and which convey ideas to our minds, we also *see* emotions displayed which, as it were, corroborate the evidence of our other senses. And if these are inconsistent with the ideas with which we have been accustomed to associate the characters, so much the more disagreeable is the effect produced; or if in perfect accordance with our preconceived ideas, so much the more agreeable.[1]

So in the productions of the Sculptor's Art it is the felicitous manner in which the expression is portrayed by the form of the features of the face, and by the attitude of the figure, that excites our admiration. I here use the word 'attitude' to express the general harmony of all the parts with the emotion, the effect of which is sought to be displayed in the face. Let us take, as an instance, the Apollo of the Vatican, that statue which is known so well, and considered almost faultless; yet if all its parts were exactly reproduced as they are, but the position of the head altered, so as to give the look another direction than that which the arrow just discharged from the bow would take, the whole work would become without meaning.

Remove the head altogether, and still the statue, though deprived of that part in which expression is commonly thought to be alone conveyed, so far from being meaningless, will exhibit even to an uneducated eye much of that majestic dignity which gives the work its foremost place amongst the creations of the Sculptor's Art.

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[1] The saying that the Shakespeare of the closet can never be equalled by that of the stage merely means that there never have been actors who have understood the characters in the play in the *same manner* as other individuals may do, although their *reading* (as the expression is) may, after all, be the correct one.

As the mind becomes more and more educated, even smaller fragments of Sculpture declare their meaning, and enable us in imagination to reconstruct them as they once existed.

Not far from the Apollo is that mutilated portion of a statue called the Torso, which, to most persons who see it, presents nothing calculated to excite admiration: a mere trunk deprived of head and limbs; yet on this fragment artists gaze with enthusiastic rapture, and Michael Angelo is said to have considered it the most wonderful work in the magnificent collection in which it stands.

In Sculpture, above all the other arts, a certain amount of knowledge is required in the beholder to enable him to appreciate beauty in its products. It seems as if it is necessary that the effect produced in the object should, as it were, coincide with certain preconceived ideas in the subjective intelligence. Beauty in the human figure means perfect proportion between its parts. Every person has some idea of such proportion in the human form, though these ideas vary in degree of accuracy in different individuals, from the vague notion of the majority to the minute knowledge of the anatomist, who has made the human form his especial study. When, then, a person sees a well-executed statue or group, the pleasure it affords him by its form is in proportion to the exactness with which he recognises its truth as a copy of nature.

This is *one* reason why Sculpture, of all the other arts, has less attraction for the great masses of the people. But the other reason is this: that this branch of the Fine Arts depends entirely for the pleasure it confers on the Mental Condition Space. Figure is a certain relation between the parts of Space, and proportion is the justness and fitness of relation between the parts and the whole as it appears to us.

A judgment—an act of the reasoning faculty—is necessary to arrive at a notion of what this proportion is.

The pleasure therefore which we experience in the recognition of fitness in this relation in statuary is purely intellectual, and this is the reason why colour in statuary is offensive; for the pleasure derived from the contemplation of colour depends on a *Physiological* condition of our nature; it is a *sensuous* pleasure, resulting from the manner in which our organs of vision are constructed.

Engraving also, which, like Sculpture, gives us but space enclosed by lines, and shaded to represent distance from our organs of sight is, like Sculpture, dependent on purely intellectual conditions. Black and white here only represent light and shade; but other colours as they exist in nature convey to us a certain *sensuous* pleasure, because they depend on the fact that our eyes are made as they are, *that the light reflected from certain colours, and certain combinations of colours, give us a feeling of pleasure, and from others produce disagreeable sensations in us.* White marble, then, has always been considered the most desirable material for the highest efforts of the Sculptor.

As the human form is the most perfect which we know, representations of it are considered as the noblest effect which Sculpture can produce. Draped figures are seldom successful unless the drapery is such as not to conceal the figure beneath; but when drapery takes the form of the costume of modern times, it must always look absurd.

There is not, nor ever will be, a statue in the costume of the present time which can be seen from *every point of view* without being ridiculous in some; and as such statues are generally so placed that they can be seen from many points of view, it is almost impossible they could look to advantage in all. For instance, the Guards' Memorial looks well from Waterloo-place, but how differently from Regent-street. The proper position for such a group would be with its back to some building, so that only the front view could be seen.

There are two statues by Mr. Foley which are considered very successful efforts in every way, but more especially as figures clothed in modern costume. I refer to those of Goldsmith and Burke in front of Trinity College, Dublin.

I never see them but I think that the position in which they are placed has a great deal to do with the effect produced. They are both very correct in pose, and well executed in detail; but as they are placed about fifteen feet from the front of the façade of Trinity College, so no person can pass behind them; there can be no back view except from the windows of the building; so that the position, in fact, is that of an *alto-relievo.*

If artists are compelled to dress their works in a particular costume, they are not to be blamed if it does not look graceful.

If the friends of some one, who has been mayor of some place, insist that he shou[illegible]ve a statue, dressed in a tailed coat, all the [illegible]ich can be brought to bear on it will not m[illegible]eful.

On the other hand, I am far from advocating that such a man should be immortalised as a corpulent Apollo, or go down to posterity, as a model to industrious apprentices, in the flowing robes of a Roman senator.

I would say, if such men are not models of *physical beauty*, they should not have statues at all. There are ways of commemorating the public virtues of men besides erecting images of them to disfigure our streets and squares.

What beauty has the statue in Bloomsbury-square, or that of Stephenson in Euston-square (draped with clothes which look as if they were bought ready-made in Tottenham-court-road), or utility, except for nursery-maids to frighten refractory children with as the representatives of monsters in human form! 'To what strange uses do we come!'

There is nothing beautiful in the ordinary human form clothed in modern costume; these statues disfigure, instead of ornamenting, a city, unless they are so high up that they cannot be closely seen, like that of Nelson in Trafalgar-square, or as that of Napoleon I. was in the Place Vendôme.

When it was not for the beauty of their physical form that these men were held in esteem by their fellow men, why should it be represented?

I would not be understood to mean that the portraits and busts of eminent public characters should not as much as possible be multiplied; it is always an interesting study for after-generations to endeavour to discover, in faithful representations of the *features* of remarkable men, signs of those qualities in which they differed from the generality of their fellows. Whether the theory of Lavater be correct or not, there is some such belief that the features reflect the character of the man.

But the objection is to placing in a city full-length statues; which works, as they have no higher design than to be portraits, in most instances the more faithfully they represent the individual to whom they are set up, the more ugly they are. It is not the statue of the 'human form divine' we have; it is the statue of an elderly gentleman, with his bald head, his corpulency, and his coat.

Now I think it may be laid down as an incontrovertible maxim, that the shape of any of the modern styles of coats cannot be beautiful when modelled in bronze.

Fancy the Apollo Belvedere in such a costume! Can anything more absurd be imagined? Yet we have throughout London statues quite as absurd of men who, by their lives, did not deserve so to be caricatured.

If such a use of the Plastic Art is to continue, our artists should study tailoring as well as anatomy; for whatever degree of proficiency artists have shown in the latter study, as exhibited in modern statues, they have exhibited a lamentable ignorance in the latter branch of their art. To speak more seriously, as Sculpture is an imitative Art, the only objects which it has for imitation are material objects, whether they be the human form, or the form of the lower animals, or that of inorganic matter. That the imitation may be beautiful, the thing imitated must be beautiful also. Of these the human figure *in perfection* is the most beautiful, as it excels in the just proportion of its parts; close representations of it are in all cases the most successful; but in such imitations it is only the beauty of the objects represented which is conveyed, by the mind of the artist through his work, to other minds. It is believed by some that it is in the power of this art to produce in statues what is called *ideal* beauty, which never had any existence but in the imagination of the designer. There never, they say, could have been a model for the Apollo Belvedere; therefore the beautiful proportions which characterise that statue are creations of the artist's mind. This mistake arises from ignorance of that fundamental law of the human mind, that it cannot create its own object. The human mind can but join or divide, distinguish or compare ideas which have been given to it by experience; it can create no new idea of its own; it can but form new combinations of those which it has already obtained. In the Apollo, as in the statue of a Centaur, the artist has but combined ideas which he had before seen separated. In the latter case, he joins the head which he had seen as a part of the human body to the rest of what he had seen with a horse's head. In the former case, he combined a copy of a handsome head and neck, which he had seen joined to an imperfectly-formed body, to a copy of a perfectly-formed body, which he had seen joined to an ugly head and neck.

But to produce such a combination the artist must be possessed of a consummate taste, and have selected to unite in one image, from different individuals, those parts of their bodies by which they were considered more perfect than their fellows. As to their outward form, the Apollo and the Venus de Medicis are but representations of combinations of beauties, which probably never were seen united in any individual of the human race.[2]

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[3] Since the above was written, a writer in *Fraser's Magazine* (Jan. 1873) describes the manner in which Gibson and Thorwald-

But in the former, as I have before observed, there is conveyed also in the expression of the features and in the attitude of the figure those ideas which inspired Byron in his description of

> 'The lord of the unerring bow,
> The god of life and poesy and light,
> The sun in human limbs array'd,
> And brow all radiant from his triumph in the fight;'

and which are superadded to the representation of superior manly beauty by the intellectual power of

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sen produced their masterpieces: 'Goethe, writing from Rome ten years before the arrival of Thorwaldsen, raises the question which lies at the root of all ideal sculpture, a question asked again and again, both by critics and artists, how the Greeks "evolved from the human form their system of divine types, which is so perfect and complete that neither any leading character nor any intermediate shade or transition is wanting." "For my part," writes Goethe, "I cannot withhold the conjecture that the Greeks proceeded according to the same laws that Nature works by, and which I am endeavouring to discover." Raphael had somewhat the same thought when, after deploring the paucity of beautiful women, he says that, "to paint a beautiful figure, he must see others more beautiful, and that he had striven hard to attain within his mind a certain ideal." Some such ideal, either latent in nature or patent in Greek art, was the constant pursuit of Thorwaldsen and of Gibson. The search after beauty was with both the main purpose of long and laborious lives. Gibson started with the maxim that the Greeks were always right; he was known to say that, in commencing a figure, he asked himself what the Greeks would under the circumstances have done. Thorwaldsen, in practice at least, conformed to the same principle. The writer once heard Gibson describe his method when at work on the Bacchus. "I chose," he said, "three of the finest male models in Rome, and the artist. In the Venus de Medicis the expression conveyed is that of maiden modesty, heightened by the fact that the statue is entirely undraped.

But, it may be asked, whence do we obtain this first idea of proportion, which is the test of merit, as to the fitness of the proportions of the human form? I think, in a great measure, these ideas must be referred to the experience of what men

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when the figure was somewhat advanced, a female model was also engaged, because the Greeks usually threw into Bacchus female traits." This anecdote indicates that Gibson, like Goethe, had faith in high generic types, existent not only in old Greek art, but in living nature. Gibson would not admit that he neglected nature; and yet it may be safely affirmed that he never went to nature without Phidias at his elbow. That Thorwaldsen worked on like principles may be proved by his procedure when modelling his Venus. We are told that no less than thirty models were used over the period of three years devoted to this faultless work. Thorwaldsen's Venus is the highest embodiment of the Goddess of Beauty since the time of the Greeks. Canova's Venus and Gibson's Venus are inferior works. The unison of conception is complete; the thirty models are blended into one goddess—a figure which seems not the compilation of years, but the instantaneous issue of the artist's brain. Accidents and blemishes are thrown out; here, in short, the generic form of Greek art and the typical form of actual nature prove identical. This and other of the sculptor's ideal figures fulfil the conditions under which individual forms may assume godlike aspect. The Greeks, said Winckelmann, ascended from heroes to gods "rather by subtraction than by addition; that is to say, by the gradual abstraction of all those parts which even in nature are sharply and strongly expressed until the shape becomes refined to such a degree, that only the spirit within appears to have brought the outward form into being." '

have considered beauties in particular instances. Probably a Chinese would think the foot of the Venus de Medicis too large. In the imitations of other objects such ideal beauty does not exist, at least for the generality of mankind. No one speaks of a rose executed in marble which would be to real existing roses what the Venus de Medicis is to real women.

Yet a gardener, or a judge at a flower-show, will find fault with certain flowers for defects not appreciable by others, and I have no doubt such trained adepts could construct (at least in imagination) a model rose or an ideal dahlia.

The second cause of this mistake is a confusion of ideas of the Beautiful in Material objects and Mental attributes.

With regard to the former, we cannot imagine anything better, or indeed otherwise than we have experienced them to exist; but as regards Mental attributes, we can suppose that there might be something more perfect than what we are conscious of, but of such we have not a positive but only a negative idea. In Sculpture, as in all the other imitative arts, it is often by means of their products that we are led to appreciate the beauty of the objects which they represent.

The artist, through his works, shows us how the beauty of natural objects affects his mind, which has been accustomed to look for beauties in them, and teaches us where to look, and how to look for them.

He is the initiated into the mysterious appeals of Nature to the human soul, and in his work calls the attention of the vulgar to hearken to her voice; he 'wakes the soul by gentle strokes of Art,' to listen to the lessons of the universe, which teach the wisdom and benevolence of its Creator. So far, then, this is an account of the beauty which characterises the *form only* of material objects; but there is a higher power given to the artist than the mere exact imitation of the excellences which are to be found in the shape of material objects.

To him is also given *the power to endow inanimate matter with the appearance of being possessed by intelligence.*

No mere mechanical skill can effect this, without the conception of the feeling which is sought to be expressed.

An actor must forget his own individuality in that of the person whose part he takes, if he will succeed in the representation.

So the Sculptor must ful [illegible] the id [illegible] would represent by the inani [illegible] he [illegible] on, to be able to convey such idea to the mind of others by the results of his work.

Next to the Apollo Belvedere, I think the finest work the world possesses is the Mercury in the Museo Nationale in Naples. It was found in Herculaneum, and is probably an original Greek statue. It represents Mercury seated on a rock, meditating whither his next flight through space shall be.

This statue has been called Mercury reposing, but this name is most inappropriate. The messenger of the gods has but just lighted from his aerial flight, *to think* for a moment, before he bounds into space again. Words can convey no notion of the life which fills, as it were, every portion of the metal. Every muscle is portrayed as if it were *just* about to be put into action, and the figure ready to spring into the air. The face has a look of momentary mental abstraction, which accounts for the momentary pause in the action of the figure.

As a piece of anatomical study, the figure is perfection, but to this is added that appearance of volition and intelligence which genius alone can give to inanimate matter. Numerous have been the copies of this famous work, but none of which can bear the slightest comparison with the original.

It appears strange why there should be this impossibility to produce copies of works of art equal to the original, and this has been attributed to the superior excellence of the originals. This, I believe, is not the case. Of course the more perfect a work is, the more difficult it is to imitate it; but I think an exact copy of even a work of mediocre merit might be as difficult to be produced. It seems to me to arise from the fact mentioned before, that to produce a lifelike effect, *the idea which the artist wishes to convey must be vividly present to his own mind, and, as it were, infused into his work.*

Copyists merely imitate the form of the limbs and general figure; therefore the effect of this mental feeling is wanting in their productions. For the same reason I believe that copies of modern statues—for example, of Canova's Perseus or Michael Angelo's Moses—might fall as far short of the perfection of the originals as copies of the Greek statues do of them.

It is not on account of their inferiority as works of art that copies of masterpieces are to be despised; far inferior works *as originals* are highly prized; it is the servile manner in which the mere outline is preserved without the 'life' conferred on it which the *maker* alone can create.

But the most deeply-interesting question relative to this subject is, as to the cause of the intrinsic superiority of the productions of Greek Art to all the works which have ever since been executed.

It is, I believe, now the opinion of those most competent to judge in such matters, both Archæologists and Sculptors, that we do not possess a single original Greek statue in marble, and that the Apollo of the Vatican and the Venus de Medicis are but copies, executed by Roman artists, of original Greek statues, when it became fashionable in Rome to ape the manners and customs of the Greeks.

With regard to the Venus, it seems to me very probable that such is the case; for this reason, that the Venus of the Capitol seems to be another copy, on a larger scale, of the same original. It is certainly an inferior work in every respect to the Venus de Medicis; yet as it is of much larger size, the probability is that the smaller of the two is not the original, but that both are copies of another work of greater merit than either.

There are several other reasons known to archæologists which accumulate the evidence that such is the case. But whether it is so or not, I believe the Apollo Belvedere and the Venus de Medicis are the only two perfect works which can claim to be original works of the highest order of Grecian Art.

The statues which once adorned the Parthenon (now in the British Museum), though undoubtedly original works, are of an inferior class; they are but Architectural ornaments, and from the position which they were intended to occupy, they were finished with less care, and were, moreover, cramped as to design, on account of the exigencies of the Architectural style they were to adorn.

It is therefore very doubtful whether we have *in marble* an example of the highest order of Grecian Art. And on the supposition that these world-renowned statues are but copies of still finer works, how perfect must not these works have been!

As a proof of the perfection to which Art had attained in Greece, we have in the Museo Nationale at Naples a splendid collection of what are probably original Greek works in bronze.

Herculaneum, in the ruins of which these statues and statuettes were discovered, was a Grecian colony, and probably these bronzes are the work of Greek artists.

At all events, they are infinitely superior to any works of the kind now in existence.

What strikes one most with regard to them is, that even in what were but intended for articles of daily use the most perfect artistic finish has been attained. I will instance, as an example, the figure of the Drunken Silenus, which appears to have formed a stand to support a lamp.

In this figure the idea of intoxication is exhibited in every part, as I heard it expressed, even to the fingers, so that no person could possibly mistake the notion which the artist meant to convey.

But it may be asked, if even those statues which are looked on as models of perfection to modern artists are but copies of still better works, what reason can be given why modern artists, with all their superior advantages, cannot produce original works at all events equal to these?

I believe the cause is in the manner in which modern statues are executed. Whoever has been in an artist's studio must know that, as a matter of fact, the artist *does not himself produce the statue from the block of marble*. He but models his idea in clay, and his workmen, *by measurements in the most business-like and mechanical manner*, set about to reproduce the form of that model in marble.

In the Greek statues I believe the artist himself executed the *entire effect*, and so with every stroke of his mallet infused his mind into his work. There is a very suggestive passage in Mr. Ruskin's *Seven Lamps of Architecture* which illustrates this fact. He attributes the effect which he calls 'life' in the representations of organic objects, plants, or animals, which form the ornaments of certain specimens of mediæval architecture, to the fact that these ornaments were the work of men who not only devoted their entire attention to the excellence of the results which they had to produce, but also *took a delight* in the execution of them. I think the expression he makes use of is, that unless the workmen *were happy* while engaged in their labour the effect of such labour could not inspire the emotions of beauty which it does. If the workmen worked simply to earn a certain amount of wages in a certain time, as is commonly the case in our modern buildings, the ornaments, *however true as representations of natural objects*, would therefore want that appearance of 'truth and life' which characterises the efforts of the builders of the masterpieces of former ages. I believe the same condition is necessary to produce a perfect specimen of the Sculptor's Art; and if the question be logically considered, the reason will be apparent. Every statue or group is the copy of an image which the artist conceived before he commenced the work, however it may be elaborated during its execution. Every modification which during the progress of the work the mass of matter receives is the result of the original Mental intention, ever tending towards an exact copy of the image in the first instance present to the Artist's mind. Every stroke of the mallet is directed to such an end, provided *it is the consequence of such an intention* on the part of the workman, that is, if the workman and the designer be one, if the artist be the ποιήτης, in the original Greek sense of the word.

From these considerations it follows that any transfer of the means of carrying out the original idea by the original designer to another must so far disturb the progress of the intention towards its ultimate end; and in order that a statue be in exact correspondence with the artist's conception, it is necessary that he himself or some one imbued with his spirit should elaborate it to the end.

But how different is the practice at present! The marble figure is the work of men who have not necessarily either taste or genius; and even if they were endowed with such gifts, the practice to which they are accustomed of habitually copying the ideas of other minds would render them incapable of exercising them. If painters adopted the same mode of executing their works, and merely sketched the outline of the intended picture, and left to others the task of laying on the colours, modern painting would be in a similar condition, with reference to those works which the artists worked on themselves, as modern Sculpture is compared with the works of the ancient Greeks.

The results of the Sculptor's Art will again attain that excellence, when artists themselves, with their own labour, imprint on their works those characteristics of 'truth and life' which genius alone can give to inanimate matter by means of modifications produced in its external form by the action of Mental power.

In accordance with this view, I believe the reason why the ancient statues are so life-like compared with the modern is because the former received their form directly from the mind that, in the first instance, conceived it, while the so-called *original* modern statues are but in reality *copies* executed in marble (by common workmen) of the original clay model designed by the artists.

As has been mentioned before, another branch of Art, that of Engraving, has much in common with Sculpture as to the manner in which it excites emotions of the Beautiful in our minds, and its results for the same reasons differ from painting that uncoloured statues do from coloured, viz. that they do not depend on a *sensuous* gratification for the pleasure they confer as works of Art. They depend for their appreciation merely on the Mental condition Space, on account of a certain recognised fitness as to the proportion which they exhibit as objects of sight.

Neither please the eye by brilliancy or contrasts of colour, which effects have their origin for the gratification they afford us because of the manner in which our organs of sight are formed. As observed before, it is merely a sensual *accident* (if I may use the term) that some colours, and some combinations of colours, please us, and others do not.

Colour depends entirely for its apperception on the manner in which our eyes are formed as instruments capable of, somehow or other we know not, transferring certain ideas from Material objects to our Minds.

What is called colour-blindness is by no means uncommon. Persons who are affected with this incapacity of distinguishing one colour from another are incapable of what I call the *sensuous* delight afforded by the physiological arrangement of our visual organs, and are therefore unable to appreciate, for instance, the brilliant contrasts and harmonious blending of colours in the pictures of Rubens, but are quite as well able as their fellows of the same education in Art to experience delight from the apperception of correct proportion in a statue, or the effects of light and shade in an engraving by Morghen.

I have classed together these works of Art which depend for their attributes of beauty in the manner in which they occupy Space, which I call the Pyschological condition of beauty, as distinguished from those powers in them which depend (as colour and sounds) on the Physiological characteristics of our nature, on the manner in which our eyes and ears are formed. Works of Art produced by the Sculptor depend almost entirely for the emotion of beauty which they excite in our minds on the former of these principles. I hope to render this distinction clearer when I come to speak of Painting, which depends for its effects almost equally on both conditions of our being, Mental and Physical.

CHAPTER III.

ARCHITECTURE.

NEXT to Sculpture, Architecture, of all the Fine Arts, depends for the character of beauty in its products on a Psychological principle, the Mental condition Space. An eminent modern author, in the distinction which he draws between Architecture and Building, seems to limit the province of the former Art to the ornamentation of edifices erected by man for useful purposes.

But I would extend the meaning of the word Architecture to the Art of erecting Buildings in the best possible form, for the purposes for which they are intended. Mr. Ruskin confines the name 'to that art which, taking up and admitting as conditions of its working the necessities and common uses of the building, impresses on its form characters venerable or beautiful, but otherwise unnecessary;' and goes on to say, 'thus, I suppose, no one would call the laws architectural which determine the height of a breastwork or the position of a bastion. But if to the stone facing of that bastion be added an unnecessary feature, as a cable moulding, *that* is Architecture.

'It would be similarly unreasonable to call battlements or machicolations architectural features, so long as they are only an advanced gallery, supported on projecting masses, with open intervals beneath for offence.

'But if these projecting masses be carved beneath into rounded courses, which are useless, and if the headings of the intervals be arched and trefoiled, which is useless, *that* is Architecture.'[1]

But surely the very form of the building itself, without ornaments of any kind, is a subject for Architectural skill. The laws which determine the height of a breastwork or battlement are architectural; because if such parts of the edifice be *out of proportion* to the rest of the building, no matter how much it is ornamented with cable mouldings or rounded courses, it cannot be beautiful. Farther, such a restriction of the term would imply that, unless within a certain distance, *so that the ornaments on the building can be perceived*, no architectural excellence in a building can be admitted as possible. On the contrary, I believe it is in the due proportion observable *in the outline of a building* that architectural beauty consists, and that such beauty depends, like that of Sculpture, on the mental law or condition *Space*. I believe that the Parthenon at Athens is as beautiful as an *edifice*, as an architectural work, without its Sculptures as with them. No doubt the Sculpture and Painting (as is supposed) of the ornaments on the frieze of that building, to a close observer, contributed to the interest with which it might be examined; but from a distance of a quarter of a mile, the perfection of these ornaments as works of art could not in any way add to the beauty of the design.

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[1] *Seven Lamps of Architecture.*

Unlike those of Sculpture, architectural works acquire beauty in some small degree from the use of colour; but this use of colour has its origin altogether in conventional usage. It is in very few cases admissible as an ornament on the outside of buildings; and when it is, it must have the character of necessity—not of having been adopted for the sake of ornament alone.

How well red-brick buildings look as features in our English landscape; but how detestable is the appearance of a house which we know is painted brick-colour!

How tawdry is the effect of the frescoes on the outside of Italian houses, which, as decorations of a room, would be pretty enough.

The knowledge of the *nature* of materials, and their adaptability to the purposes for which they are employed, has also its effect on us to produce ideas of beauty or deformity in works of Architecture. But for the most part it is the manner in which a building occupies Space that it is beautiful or not, although there is none of the Fine Arts which is so subject to conventional rules as Architecture. In it alone there are certain established forms, which are called *styles*, and are accepted as examples, to differ from which in any great degree is considered wrong. Yet these examples cannot, from the nature of things, be the best possible forms in which buildings can be erected. They have had their origin in some measure in the necessity which the first architects were under, from the nature of the materials with which they had to build, and from their knowledge of the strength and capabilities of such material for being formed into edifices suitable for certain purposes.

The history of Architecture, as seen in the forms of its results, is a history of the progress of the experience of mankind in the knowledge of the strength of materials; and the peculiar characteristics of the Architecture of any country in some degree represent the qualifications of the building materials which that country supplies.

Let us take the example of the column, as a support for a superincumbent mass of material. When men *excavated* habitations, its first form was probably that of a portion of rock left uncut, in order to support the roof of an artificial cave hewn from the rock. As such a pillar, great thickness in comparison with its height would be its special attribute; and such we find in the form of the column in Egyptian Architecture. When men first commenced to *build* habitations, the *column* in the edifice kept the same proportion as the pillar in the cave; and as time gave knowledge as to the amount of strength required, the tendency was to reduce its thickness and extend its height. Even in what are called the *five* orders of Architecture, we see the proportion of the thickness to the height of the column decreasing from the Doric to the Composite. Afterwards, in the Gothic styles, the same tendency is evident; until at last expedients were introduced to transfer the weight which the column *ought to bear* to other parts of the building, in order to be able to make them so slender as to be merely ornaments, not necessary parts of the structure.

Again, the arch became a necessity when the quarries of a country would not furnish stone of a character from which long *lintels* could be formed to cover the spaces between the columns. And here again in Gothic Architecture we see, as experience gave knowledge of the weight which the arch could bear, the span getting wider and wider, from the lancet window to the Tudor archway. Thus the origin of Architectural styles must have been in some measure accidental. If the quarries of Greece did not furnish long *lintels*, what we now call Grecian Architecture would have been impossible. But whatever was the origin of these conventional forms of buildings, they are now accepted as the shapes which buildings ought to assume, and so recognised as the criterion to which all structures which claim architectural excellence must be referred to as to the special features of their formation.

But as the forms which the buildings assumed are so far accidental and arbitrary, the special characteristics of all kinds of Architecture are in reality of equal merit, if they equally answer the purposes for which they are designed.

Yet there is one criterion as to their construction to which all buildings must conform, if they are to possess attributes which impress us with the emotion of the Beautiful, and that is, that all the parts must be in correct proportion to each other and to the whole. But this proportion has no reference to certain forms which Architects have chosen to adopt as examples of perfection. It depends on the relation which *must* subsist between the parts of a building to insure its stability. Every building must give us the idea of its being able to endure the injurious agencies in nature which are ever tending to destroy it, as a work of human intelligence and skill.

First of all, the law of Gravity is ever directly antagonistic to the stability of every building, as well as other phenomena in nature which are ever tending to destroy the cohesion of the parts of all material substances, and so militate against its existence as a work of Art.

That building, then, which from its shape possesses the greatest capability of resistance to Gravity, and is composed of the material which is best able to resist the effects of time, combined with the most perfect adaptability to the purpose for which it is intended, is, no matter whether it is in the form which has been called Grecian or Gothic, the most perfect work of the Architect's mind. And, as a matter of fact, those forms which men have, as it would at first appear, arbitrarily set up as perfect specimens of this Art do possess these attributes.

There is such a relation between the parts of the Parthenon—say between the columns and the pediment—which cannot be much departed from without causing the building to look ugly. If the apex of the pediment were made five feet higher than it is, and the columns left as they are, they would look as if unable to support the weight, or, in other words, less able to withstand the effects of Gravitation. On the other hand, were it made flatter, they would look more than sufficiently strong for the purpose for which they were required.

With regard to the material of which buildings are composed, that which appears to us the most lasting gives us the idea of most beauty. No matter how beautiful the outward form of a building covered with cement may be, we do not feel the admiration in regard to it that we would were it executed in stone. It is principally with regard to the material which composes them that we become affected by a recognition of beauty in the colour of buildings. As far as regards the outside of buildings, I do not believe that the addition of any colour to that which is the natural colour of the stone can produce ideas of the Beautiful.

Nothing to my mind can be more mean than the effect of the inlaid work on the Campanile of Giotto at Florence. Seen from across the square, the proportions of that building are very beautiful; but when one's attention is directed to the colour produced by the inlaid work, one wonders how a mind like that of Giotto could descend to such means to excite admiration.

This incrustation, with thin bits of marble not more than an inch square, is one of the most remarkable instances of the falsehood which Mr. Ruskin so inveighs against that I have ever seen. Here I would apply the observation with regard to the effect which the material of which buildings are composed has to inspire us with ideas of beauty or deformity.

The more lasting the material, the more we regard it as beautiful; but this rule applies *only to the outside* of buildings; for in the inside the material has not to contend against the effects of climate, and therefore the incrustation of *the inner* walls of buildings with marbles, or the painting of them in fresco, is perfectly allowable. Therefore wood-carving is beautiful and appropriate in interior decoration, but barely, if at all, allowable in exterior ornamentation. The outside of a building, when it is stone, should be the stone of which the whole is composed. But in the Campanile at Florence the marble of which the inlaid pattern on the outside is formed is not, and could not be, the stone of which the whole building is formed, and consequently is a falsehood.

Beauty, then, in *architecture* consists in the shape of the mass of the building, and the outline of its several parts as occupying Space. Beauty in the *decoration* of buildings is no doubt a part of the Architect's object, but a subservient one, and has for the most part to do only with the manner in which the interior is finished.

The apperception of the Beautiful in the former case has its origin in the same Psychological fact of our nature as that which gives us ideas of the Beautiful in Sculpture, the Mental condition Space; while whatever idea of beauty we derive from the use of colour in Architecture depends on the Physical law of our Material organisation, that corporeal condition of our organs of vision by which they are adapted to transmit pleasurable emotions to us when affected by certain attributes in Material objects which we call colours.

This latter or Physiological condition of our nature is *accidental and arbitrary*, depending only on the peculiar manner in which our eyes are formed for the purpose of informing us of things without us. Any injury to these instruments so constructed deprives us of pleasures which are the concomitant of sensations transmitted by means of these instruments to our minds.

On the other hand, those pleasures which we experience from the just proportion of the parts of material things are the concomitants of ideas *universal and necessàry,* the result of a law of Mind, according to which we *must* think of all things, if we think at all, which is binding on every mental act, whether of conception or imagination—the Mental condition Space. It is possible to imagine that, as Physical Science advances, farther discoveries may be made as to the manner in which the nerves, or other of the component parts of our corporeal system, are acted on by the *sensation of colours* so as to produce pleasing effects; but it will ever remain impossible to refer the intellectual pleasures depending on peculiar perceptions of attributes which are referable to Mental conditions, such as Time and Space, to any other than intellectual laws.

As to the emotion of Sublimity produced by architectural effects, it is, as in all results of human power, only *indirectly* produced by them as works of Art.

It is *directly* produced by their appearance as material objects, without any reference to their cause.

It is only in Architecture and Engineering that the objects produced can convey *directly* the idea of the Sublime, because of *their great size* compared with the other results of human labour.

But *indirectly* the appearance of such objects excites the emotion of the Sublime, when we *reflectively* refer their existence to the *Mind* which first conceived the idea of constructing them, and the sustained Mental effort which guided the labour of the workmen.

When, for instance, one stands beside the Victoria Tower of the Houses of Parliament, and looks up to the immense height to which its enormous mass rises above him, he experiences the emotion of the Sublime. This is, in the first instance, caused by the perpendicularity with which the wall rises from the pavement on which he stands. Examined carefully, this emotion seems to me to be a feeling of *fear* of the mass falling.

This feeling of fear would be felt in an equally strong degree, perhaps stronger, if the mass of material which is now a tower was a mass of natural rock. But if instead of rising perpendicularly from the pavement, it receded from the perpendicular every hundred feet, this *direct* effect of sublimity would be much less strongly experienced.

The dome of St. Paul's is as high as the Victoria

Tower, but no such effect is produced by standing in St. Paul's-churchyard.

Thus the *immediate* effect of sublimity produced by the sight of architectural works is exactly the same as that produced by those objects *in nature* which inspire that emotion, and is, as Burke has well observed, accompanied by a feeling of fear or terror.

But the emotion of sublimity produced by such buildings considered *as works of Art* has no such feeling of fear. It is the result of a judgment. It arises when, on reflection, we come to think how daring was the mind which conceived the idea of placing this enormous mass of masonry on four arches, each, I believe, forty feet high, and how perfect a knowledge of the weight which such arches could sustain was required; then the true notion of the sublimity of the work, considered *as a work of Art*, as *an effect wrought on material things by Mental power*, arises in our minds.

The difficulty with which we know an architectural work to have been accomplished, as well as its being the first of the kind attempted, adds still more to this emotion of the Sublime. How much more is the effect of sublimity produced by the interior view of the dome of St. Peter's increased when we know the mind of Michael Angelo was the first to conceive the idea of placing such a dome in a position so high above the earth, and remember his saying that he would raise the dome of the Pantheon in the air!

But in *itself*, as a *building*, the church of St. Peter's does not produce the idea of sublimity in such a degree as any tower even half its height which rises sheer from the ground, as the tower of St. Mark at Venice. Here, again, what I have called the *immediate* idea of sublimity produced by works of Art is really only the same as that produced by natural objects; that which I have described as produced by high towers is exactly similar to that which is produced by the sight of a precipice. Did the Campanile of St. Mark or the Victoria Tower stand near the edge of a high rock, the effect of this *immediate* emotion of the Sublime would be much more increased.

The principal defect in the view of the façade of St. Peter's at Rome is the dwarfed appearance of the stupendous dome, because it is placed so far from the front of the building on account of the length of the nave. If Bramante's ground-plan of the building had been adhered to, the dome would be much nearer the front of the building, and consequently the façade have a much more imposing effect, because what I have called the *immediate* emotion of the Sublime would have increased that arising from the consideration of the genius of the architect.

But this latter *reflective mediate* idea arising from the contemplation of the object as a work of Art, as an *effect of human intellect* would be the same. It seems also necessary that there should be a belief that the contemplation of any architectural work was originally the intention of one mind, in order to produce this emotion in the mind of the person contemplating the result. Unquestionably one of the most *elaborate* works of Architecture in the world is Milan Cathedral; but of all the buildings I have ever seen, it least of all raises an emotion of the Sublime. And this, I believe, arises from the fact that it is the result of the mental conceptions of several architects. As in Sculpture there must be a unity of idea in the whole figure, so in Architecture there must be a unity of idea in the whole building. The most learned architect probably could not tell where the idea of the first architect of Milan Cathedral ended, and that of his successor began; but to even an unskilled person, the want of dignity in the whole effect is apparent in the first glance.

Here also we have an example that the most profuse ornamentation, which, according to Mr. Ruskin, is the whole object of Architecture, cannot confer beauty, much less dignity, on a building, unless its *general outline* conforms to our ideas of the Beautiful in shape. Milan Cathedral, with its thousand statues, produces only the impression that the architects were at a loss how to spend the money they had at their disposal.

On the other hand, let us consider the Parthenon as it is now, deprived of all the ornaments which once adorned it. Its outline at first sight fills the mind with the idea of simple and majestic grandeur, because its mass fills space in the form which best represents strength combined with beauty. The triglyphs and the fluting of the columns, which Mr. Ruskin says are its only recommendations, have nothing whatever to do with its superior beauty, as a building when seen from a distance, compared with the confectionery-looking appearance of Milan seen in the same manner.

It is the beauty of the Parthenon which has made triglyphs and fluted columns associated with the Doric order of Architecture. Had there been any other ornament or no ornament at all on that building, it would still receive all the praise it does as a perfect specimen of architectural art.

The Gothic stone roof also raises in the mind ideas of sublimity; but that it may have such an effect, the spectator must know or believe it is composed of stone. For in this instance also, the *immediate* emotion of sublimity is the same as that produced by the roof of a natural cave, and the higher it is the greater is the effect.

Nothing can have a meaner appearance than stone pillars supporting a roof of lath and plaster, or even of brickwork covered with plaster, as is the case in the restored cathedral of St. Patrick in Dublin.

Another emotion of sublimity is produced by the expression of elaborate care made evident in the manner in which the details of ornamentation of a building are carried out, for this is a proof of the unity of design in the mind of the architect. Here we become cognisant of the command of the master-mind over the subordinate labour in the work. Thus, in the chapel of Henry VII. at Westminster, the exquisite tracery of the roof raises a feeling of the Sublime which the mere height is not sufficient to produce.

For this reason also, a certain amount of recurrence of the same effect in a building gives us an idea of sublimity, because by such effect we are assured that the whole edifice is the effect of one single conception in the mind of the architect. The recurrence of the columns and intervals in a long colonnade produces this effect of unity of design. And indeed in all Grecian Architecture a certain appearance of uniformity is necessary for its beauty.

Architecture cannot be in any sense called an imitative art. Whether the first conceptions of architectural forms were *suggested* by natural forms or not, now its object is not to imitate anything in nature depending entirely for its effects of beauty and sublimity on the proportion, the fitness, and the unity of design of every part of a building to each other and the whole.

CHAPTER IV.

PAINTING.

UNLIKE Architecture, Painting is, in the strictest sense of the term, as far as the objects which it represents, an imitative art. It aims at the reproduction of whatever in nature excites in us the emotion of the Beautiful or Sublime, by means of form and colour. In the reproduction of ideas of beauty and sublimity, as caused by the apperception of certain attributes in the forms of natural objects, it depends for the manner in which the same effects are produced in the other Arts on the Mental condition Space, but for the beauty perceived in varieties of colour on a peculiar condition of our sense of vision. Our eyes are so constructed that some combinations of colours are pleasing, others displeasing, as our ears are with regard to certain successions of sounds. This analogy is so true, that we use the word *harmony* with reference to colours, as well as to sounds, to express in both arts of Painting and Music effects capable of being *fitted together* and perceived, either together or in immediate succession, as events in time.

These conditions as to the manner in which we see and hear seem to be arbitrary laws of our organs of sight and hearing. We can give no reason for this but that we are so made. In conformity, then, with this Physiological law of our being, that of colour, the object of the painter is to combine in his work such colours as are pleasing, and to avoid such as are not. Throughout the material world, the colours which predominate are in all cases harmonised by tones, even those which in Art are not so considered. Green and blue, for instance, are given in works on Art as non-contrasting colours; yet we see no discord between blue flowers and their leaves, or between the colour of the sky and trees. Therefore, to produce pleasing effects by means of colour in a painting, the artist must exactly reproduce the effect which the sight of a landscape, for instance, has upon our organs of vision.

The medium (the air) through which we see a landscape softens, as it were, the contrasts of the colours which compose it, and convey in general effect a different idea of colour to us from that which the things which make up a landscape really have, when seen near. There is thus some difference between the colours of things as they individually are, and when, as parts of a view, they are presented to our sight.

So much has been written on this subject, that I feel it unnecessary to enter at length into it, more than to state that all ideas of beauty which are excited in our minds by effects of colour in Painting are the result of the peculiar construction of our eyes, and as such are sensuous pleasures, depending on Physical laws of our being.

My object is to consider the emotions of the Beautiful and Sublime, excited by the contemplation of the results of the painter's art, which depend on our intellectual principles.

It is by the representation of forms, and by exciting thereby certain sentiments in the mind, that the painter appeals to the intellectual part of man. So far as he represents the forms of material things, like the sculptor, he appeals to our ideas of justness and proportion, depending on the Mental condition Space. On the other hand, the effects produced by splendid colouring result from the skill with which the particular tints are blended, so as to form agreeable contrasts, in conformity with corporeal conditions of sight; but, as in Sculpture, it is in the manner in which 'expression' is exhibited in the work which makes it a masterpiece or not. Colour adds to this effect; but before there was a brush laid to the canvas, the wonderful look of the Madonna della Seggiola was conceived by Raphael. It may be said that the face of the Virgin in that wonderful picture is an imitation of the face of a model. The *features* may be, probably are, a more or less accurate copy of those of a model; but the *expression* which characterises them is entirely the creation of the master's mind. The proof is this: there is the picture itself; who can copy it? If the features are those of a model, let the picture itself take the place of the model; but who can reproduce it? You may paint a copy correct in colouring, but no one yet reproduced the idea of the picture; for this reason, that no one since Raphael has been able to portray so well Mind, as expressed by outward form.

As a farther proof that it is in the representation of Mental attributes, as exhibited in the expression of the features, that genius manifests itself, I will instance another work of the same master, the Madonna della Cardelino, in the tribune of the Uffizi Gallery at Florence. It is, to my mind, the most characteristic of all Raphael's works. It represents the Virgin seated, with a book in her hand, and the Saviour and St. John as children standing beside her. The latter holds in his hand a goldfinch, which our Saviour puts forth His hand to take. St. John appears as if drawing away the bird, as if he feared the child would hurt it. In the face of the Saviour, represented as a child of about two years old, is given all the dignity of expression which can possibly be exhibited in the human countenance.

To any person who looks on the picture, it is impossible not to recognise the expression of calm dignity with which He regards St. John, who has apparently for a moment forgotten the Creator in the child.

Now it is impossible to believe that Raphael ever could have had a model for the expression delineated in the form of that child. It is a creation of the artist's intellect, and in it is embodied the most perfect expression of majesty in the human countenance which it is possible to conceive. Here, then, is more than the correct imitation of nature. The artist must have been able to realise in imagination how such feelings of dignity and majesty would exhibit themthemselves in the features of a child. This is what makes the difference between the merely mechanical and the intellectual branches of the painter's art. The former consists in the exact representation of material objects; the latter in the power of being able to represent by such forms the existence of life and intelligence. The former excites merely admiration at the skill of the workman; the latter appeals to our minds and feelings by effects produced by the mental superiority of the artist. A consideration of some examples of what I call the mechanical branch of the painter's art may render the distinction clearer.

I do not believe that exact imitation of natural appearances, even in Landscape Painting, is what is aimed at by artists. There is a sort of conventional agreement in Art as to how certain effects are to be represented. No picture has ever yet been painted with the intention of producing an effect so true to nature as to be mistaken for a window in a room, through which we saw the landscape outside; and even were such an effect produced, I doubt if it would be pleasing. In the picture by Holbein, called the 'Ambassadors,' which is a most perfect piece of detail painting, one cannot help feeling that too much of the artist's care has been bestowed on the exact imitation of objects of still life, which is carried so far as to cause the objects to appear as standing out in relief from the canvas. In none of the pictures of Gerard Dow or Mieris is this effect of objects in relief produced. It would seem that one art, that of Painting, in these effects usurps the peculiar characteristics of Sculpture, and by such attempted deceit causes us displeasure. Here I must draw a distinction between objects represented in relief and effects produced by foreshortening. In the former case, objects are represented as standing out beyond the surface of the canvas; in the latter, the rest of the objects, to the exclusion of these, are represented as receding from it. The former effect is produced by a skilful management of the shadows; the latter by correctness of the drawing in perspective. In the latter there is no deceit; the picture professes to be nothing but a piece of canvas, or panel, on which representations of natural objects are painted; but in the former, an attempt is made to represent a picture with objects carved *in relief* on the canvas or panel. Such are the lowest productions of Painting as a Fine Art, and very little removed from the house-painter, who executes a successful imitation of walnut or mahogany on the windows and doors of a room, or groined tracery represented by skilful effects of light and shade on a ceiling, as in the case of the roof of Milan Cathedral. Leaving such works out of the question, we may, in a general way, divide the results of Painting, as an Art, into two classes: those in which the object is to reproduce, by means of exact imitations of natural objects, emotions which such objects are themselves capable of exciting in our minds; and those in which, besides the effect produced by beauty of form and colour in the object represented, there is also some idea or sentiment, suggested by the artist's intention and design. This latter class embraces all what we call the higher efforts of the Art, in which effects are produced by means of representations of the human form, by which, according to the expression delineated, certain ideas are conveyed to, or certain feelings aroused in, our minds.

In a painting which represents nothing but natural or artificial objects, we can admire but the correctness of the imitation, and the care with which the picture has been elaborated.

In Landscape Painting, we not only admire the correctness with which natural objects are represented, but also the judicious *selection of the beautiful features* of form and colours of which the picture is made up. The effect of this judicious arrangement of the objects represented is what is called the picturesque in a painting, and this expression is applied to the appearance of parts of the country. We speak of a picturesque part of Wales, which means a part of that country which, from its formation and other circumstances, would furnish pleasing subjects to be represented in pictures.

I believe that the capability of realising such beauties in nature is at first awakened in us by the contemplation of works of Art. The peasantry in Cumberland and Westmoreland are quite incapable of realising the beauty of the country in which they live. Nothing is more striking in travelling through a country celebrated for its scenery than the apparently futile attempts of the uneducated classes to understand what it is that tourists see in mountains and rivers and trees, and which gives them so much pleasure. They tell you that such and such a view is *considered* very fine, but why it is finer than one of three times the *extent* near it they cannot understand; they cannot realise any superiority in one view more than another, except in point of the extent of country which can be seen at a time. Who that has been to Killarney has not observed the puzzled look on the faces of the boatmen at the enthusiastic praise which artists bestow on that exquisite bit of wood and water called the 'Meeting of the Waters'! To illustrate this, let us imagine an artist and a countryman, standing on Hampstead Heath, looking towards Harrow, which I believe the most beautiful view near London. The artist considers the prospect before him as to the effect which it would have as a picture, the latter merely as to the distance which he can see.

To the left of the view, in the immediate foreground, is a house with a red-tiled roof, partially covered with ivy. The house shows signs of age, and the roof seems to want repair; close by stands a few tall Scotch firs, which cut the distant prospect into two parts.

Both these features add to the beauty of the view in the opinion of the artist. The uneducated man would cut down the trees in order that they might not impede the view, and cut off the ivy from the house, whitewash it, and put it into thorough repair, and think he had vastly improved the scene. Why this difference of opinion? The one has an eye for the picturesque, it will be said—the other not. I cannot help thinking it is due to the fact that the one has seen how well *pictures* look which represent such objects, and if the latter had the same education, had his attention turned to the same ideas, for the same time, he would agree with the artist in every particular.

Men who have their attention always engaged in the cultivation of the useful arts are, from the nature of their pursuits, rendered in some measure incapable of appreciating the ideas conveyed by, *or even realising the existence of facts of experience* which result from the study of the Fine Arts, as men who devote their minds to *the observation of facts of Physical Science are unable to realise in thought the facts of existence which are presented in Consciousness.* The contemplation of the results of Landscape Painting, then, first awakens in us the capacity of the Beautiful in nature. In every man the capacity exists, but until it is called into action, by objects of Art, he derives no pleasure, or at least in a very small degree, from the contemplation of the Beautiful in nature.

But in this, as in the other imitative Arts, it is by and through the delineation of the human form that results in the highest degree capable of raising emotions of the Beautiful and Sublime can be produced.

In Sculpture the idea present to the mind of the artist is exhibited by means of the outward external form of man; the mere form, without any assistance from the representation of colour, is sufficient to produce the intended effect.

In Painting also the idea meant to be suggested is conveyed to the objective mind by means of the representation of external form modified by 'expression,' which is the recognised effect of particular intellectual phases; but to this is added a representation of the colours which are the attributes of natural objects. As has been before mentioned, in engraving and outline drawing the effect produced is the same as that in Sculpture, and depending on the same intellectual conditions, and has the same want of accidental assistance to heighten its effects by means of the use of colour.

My first acquaintance with Raphael's picture of the School of Athens was through an engraving, and when I saw the original in the Vatican, I found that the effect of its being coloured did not add to the dignity expressed in any one of that most perfect group of figures. Thus we experience quite as much delight from the contemplation of an original sketch of a great master as from a finished painting, because in the sketch the idea of the artist is conveyed as well as in the painting, only in the latter case it is represented in a manner more pleasing to our senses by means of the use of colours.

But amongst the ideas which may thus be expressed there are some which are much more pleasing than others, and which, provided that the merit of two pictures as works of Art be the same, cause one to be more appreciated than the other. The *subject* of the picture has a great deal to do with the merit which it has in the opinion of the great mass of the people who throng our picture galleries. Thus illustrations of everyday life are more popular than those representing subjects from ancient history.

It is to such a taste that the production of what are called sensational pictures is due, which derive the praise bestowed on them from the reality in which commonplace events are represented, like the sensational drama of late years, which seems to have no other merit than that of producing real effects in the midst of a scene which is no more than a representation of actual life.

But besides these, any Painting in the subject of which an appeal is made to certain sentiments, which are the attributes of our common human nature, will impress us more with the idea of the Beautiful than others of equal merit as works of Art.

All the great masters have taken advantage of this fact in the constitution of human nature. It is for this reason that we have such endless repetitions of the Madonna and Child compared with any other religious subject, especially in the works of Perugino, Correggio, and Murillo, but most of all in those of Raphael, who, of all others, excelled in what has been so well called the *charming and touching style*.

In his Life, by Baron von Wolzogen,[3] this, the special characteristic of the great master, is thus spoken of:

'In a similar manner, only dwelling more on the contrast between the *beautiful* and *sublime* than upon that between the *ideal* and the *characteristic,* Visher speaks of the uniqueness of Raphael, as displaying the purest style of Italian painting, adorned with all the sweetness of grace. Raphael, he says, as regards the fundamental source of the beautiful, stands allied to the *simply* beautiful, in contrast with the sublime; as regards the different stages of style, he belongs to the *charming* and *touching* style, in contrast with the *high* style; and, as regards the tendency of his painting, he takes the line of the relatively picturesque in contrast to that of the plastic Art.'

In our own Academy Exhibitions, we see it is the pictures the subjects of which are in *the simply beautiful* style, which excite the greatest interest amongst the masses of the people.

Such subjects, in themselves, do not directly produce feelings of the Sublime, but only of the Beautiful.

The former emotion is produced by paintings

[3] Translated by F. T. Burnet.

only when, as in all other works of Art, by an act of judgment, we refer them to their *cause*, when we consider them as results of *intellectual power*. 'What a sublime *conception!*' is the manner in which we hear such works spoken of. No doubt some pictures *in themselves*, on account of the subjects which they represent, may convey an idea of sublimity to the mind.

For instance, the head of the Saviour by Leonardo da Vinci, because all that characterises dignity in man is portrayed in the countenance, raising directly and immediately in us an emotion of the Sublime.

Battle scenes, from a different cause, by the idea of *terror* which they inspire, by impressing us with our inability to withstand the rage and fury of the combatants, suggest to us a feeling of a like kind to that produced by those objects in nature which inspire that passion.

But in every painting, I believe, in order that we should feel the full amount of pleasure which may be derived from the contemplation of it, a recognition of the labour bestowed on it, especially by way of Mental effort, must be present to our minds.

How much more do we not appreciate the roughest original drawing than the most finished print? Yet when, as in steel engraving, we know that the proof, although in itself a mechanical effect, is the result of all the care which has been bestowed on the plate, how much its value increases!

For this reason oleographs, although pleasing objects in themselves, are not considered of value, not so much that they are so easily obtained, but that there is no appearance of mental effort in their production. We have seen that in painting, as a Fine Art, there are two ways in which it affects us with emotions of the Sublime and Beautiful depending on two characteristics of our nature, one *Mental*, the other *Physical.* So far as in the results of this branch of the Fine Arts we become cognisant of excellence of form, such idea of beauty has its origin in our Mental faculties, as well as in whatever manner our feelings or sentiments are influenced by the *creative* power of intellect exhibited in the conformation of material objects.

Secondly, as a concomitant of this means of so awaking ideas in our minds, *on account of the peculiar manner in which the instruments which transmit the effect of the presence of material objects to our senses, to our minds, are constructed,* another source of pleasure arises, viz. that which we experience from the contrast and beauty of colour.

This secondary pleasure is, as has been shown in the case of colour-blindness, accidental and non-essential, as distinguished from the pleasure derived from form, which, having its origin in the Mental condition Space, is universal and necessary. But besides this latter characteristic of the painter's art, there is also given to the exercise of genius the power to excite in the minds of others sentiments and feelings which are the basis of the principles which hold society together for the benefit of man. Thus it is that the contemplation of works of Art tends to the elevation and refinement of the human mind. It may be said, with reference to all the subjects which painters choose as means to exhibit their skill in the delineation of material forms, if they are to be of benefit to the great mass of the people, such works ought to convey some lesson of public or private virtues.

And such has been the object of Art in all ages. It has ever been the province of painters especially to represent and hand down to posterity, as examples, men who during their lives made themselves remarkable for the disinterested virtue of their acts, and to portray scenes in their lives in which such acts of goodness were displayed.

Looking at the question in the most purely so-called rational view, it cannot be denied that the Saints of the Christian Religion were men eminently distinguished for qualities which excite the admiration of mankind. For a long period it was for the most part representations of them or their actions which gave subjects to the painter's pencil. Landscape painting, except as incidental to such subjects, as in backgrounds, was not particularly studied.

In our own days, also, we indirectly encourage such aims in Art in the decoration of our public buildings. In the Parliament Houses all the frescoes represent scenes in history, in which the valour, or the public and disinterested virtues of some of the characters who took part in them, are suggested to the mind of the beholder. But hardly, if ever, are historical paintings executed by artists with the intention of thus teaching the people to emulate the great deeds of their ancestors, unless specially ordered to ornament some building as appropriate interior decoration. And yet I think it will not be denied that, when we set about educating the lower classes by means of Art Museums, it is a matter of moment, nay of the utmost importance, what class of subjects the works of Art which they contain represent. But there is an error especially the characteristic of modern museum-providing philanthropists, that it is only necessary to take a man from the worst part of the East-end, and give him a course of Picture Galleries, in order to turn out a specimen of the enlightened English mechanic. I say that it very much depends what pictures you show him whether you make him better or worse. The object, then, of all the Fine Arts should be

> 'To wake the soul by tender strokes of art,
> To raise the genius and to mend the heart;'

to encourage and foster in the human mind those emotions to the exercise of which, because they tend to benefit the human race, this pleasure has been attached by the wisdom of our Creator.

CHAPTER V.

MUSIC.

THE pleasure which we derive from hearing a piece of Music depends, in the first place, on the *Intellectual* law or condition Time; and, secondly, on certain *Physical* conditions of our sense of hearing. The former condition, as a law of Mind, I have described in the Introduction; by the latter I mean the *Physical* condition, according to which our organs of hearing are constructed, so that some sounds, and combinations of sounds, give us pleasure, while others give us pain. This *Physical* law of our sense of hearing varies in different individuals as to the manner in which it affects them. Some persons are very sensitive of the disagreeable effect of sounds which are called discords in music, while others are scarcely conscious of them. This, in a great measure, depends on habit; and so we often hear it said that a person's *ear* has been injured or improved by hearing the sounds produced by ill or well tuned instruments.

Perhaps there are some persons who are not at all affected by hearing discords, but there is scarcely any one who is not displeased by certain single sounds; that produced by scraping slate with iron, for instance. It is, then, an almost universal condition of the human organ of hearing that we must feel unpleasant sensations when we are conscious of certain sounds, or combinations of sounds, and that we feel more or less pleasure at the production of certain others. This fact in our corporeal constitution I call a law of *sense*—that of hearing. But, before entering on the consideration of this Physical law of our being, I must first call attention to the dependence which the pleasure we derive from hearing Music has on the Mental law or condition *Time*.

Every piece of Music is arranged so as to be divided into certain equal periods of duration, each consisting of one or more sounds, or combinations of sounds, which are called notes. This disposition is called the *time* in which the piece of Music is arranged. But, besides this, each note has itself a period of duration, longer or shorter, in relation to the duration of the other notes, which together compose the air. It is this relation between the duration of the notes which constitutes the identity of the air. Whether a piece of Music be played quickly or slowly, the relative duration of each individual note in reference to the period of time occupied by the others must be preserved, or the piece of Music loses the characteristics which distinguish it from other arrangements of Musical sounds.

The pleasure we derive from hearing a piece of Music played in perfect time seems to me to consist in recognising, without any apparent effort, the recurrence of the periods of duration according to the time in which it is arranged, and perceiving *readily* the combinations of notes which the composer has joined in each *bar*. To do this we must be able to anticipate the *time* and the order in which the sounds *ought to come* in succession to those which have gone before. When we hear a few bars of an air in which the time is well marked we are at once able to anticipate the recurrence of each note, and even of several notes, in the series; and it is from this recognised uniform succession of the sounds in the series, in conformity with our *preconceived ideas*, that the pleasure we experience from hearing Music in which the *time* is distinctly marked consists.

This is why we require often to hear a piece of music in which the *time* is not distinctly marked before we can entirely appreciate its beauty. I am now speaking of the generality of persons; because those who are *educated in musical notation* can apprehend the *time* in which an air is arranged at once, while those not so used to musical arrangements require to hear such a piece of music very often before they derive any pleasure from it. For this reason, in all the melodies which have become popular the unfailing characteristic is, that the *time* in which they are composed is distinctly marked; for, unless this is so, the minds of the generality of people, in endeavouring to perceive *the recurrence of the periods of duration,* fail in the attempt; and to such persons the most beautiful arrangement of *harmony,* heard for the first time, is thought not at all comparable with some lively air in which the *time* is distinctly marked.

The Mental condition Time is universal and necessary. All human intelligence is subject to it; therefore every human being should be able to appreciate *time* in Music, and such is the fact; whereas very few (comparatively speaking) are able to appreciate the effect of *Harmony,* which depends on the *contrasts* of sounds. The first perception of delight from Music which children evince is by endeavouring *to keep time* with it, and this they do sometimes without regard, or rather with the greatest disregard, to *Harmonious* combinations of sounds.

Adults, even those bereft of reason, take delight in accompanying a musical performance with any kind of sounds or gestures which seem to mark the time. In fact, there is no human being who does not derive pleasure from the appreciation of *Time* in Music, and to the greater number this is the only pleasure they derive from it.

Time, then, is the *soul of music*. It is immaterial whether an air is played by a full orchestra or on a pianoforte; it is the same air, if the same notes, though of different sounds, are played in the same *time;* that is, if the notes preserve the same relation to each other as to their duration. For it is quite possible that there could be two distinct melodies composed of exactly the same notes, but *essentially* different only because arranged in different *time*. This delight, then, which we experience from perceiving the relation between the duration of the notes and combinations of notes in a piece of music, in relation to each other, has its origin in an ultimate fact of the intellectual part of our nature, the Mental law or condition Time.

Mr. Darwin, in his *Expression of the Emotions*, quotes a passage from Mr. Litchfeild with reference to what he calls '*expression*' in music, as follows: 'Indeed, it is obvious that whenever we feel the "expression" of a song to be due to its quickness, or slowness, of movement—to smoothness of flow, loudness of utterance, and so on—we are in fact interpreting the muscular actions which produce sound, in the same way in which we interpret muscular action generally.

'But this leaves unexplained the more subtle and more specific effect which we call the *musical* expression of the song—the delight given by its melody, or even by the separate sounds which make up the melody. This is an effect indefinable in language—one which, so far as I am aware, no one has been able to analyse, and which the ingenious speculation of Mr. Herbert Spencer as to the origin of music leaves quite unexplained. For it is certain that the melodic effect of a series of sounds does not depend in the least on their loudness, or softness, or on their *absolute* pitch. A tune is always the same, whether it is sung loudly or softly, by a child or a man; whether it is played on a flute or a trombone. The purely musical effect of any sound depends on its place in what is technically called a "scale," the same sound producing absolutely different effects on the ear, according as it is heard in connection with one or another series of sounds. It is on this relative association of the sounds that all the essentially characteristic effects which are summed up in the phrase "musical expression" depend.

'But why certain associations of sounds have such and such effects is a problem which yet remains to be solved.'

And this problem, as well as many others in the natural history of human existence, will remain unsolved as long as men will ignore the *Spiritual* element in our organisation, and endeavour to refer all the phenomena of Mind to the *Material* part of our nature.

Without venturing to put forward any theory which would embrace *all* the peculiar effects which Music produces, I believe that in the preceding pages I have explained why a tune is always the same, 'whether it is sung loudly or softly, by a child or by a man; whether it is played on a flute or on a trombone.'[1]

But there is another source of the pleasure derived from Music; that afforded by varieties of sounds, and this has its origin in the *peculiar* and *accidental*

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[1] The words I have used before to describe the identity of an air so closely resemble those here quoted from Mr. Darwin, that it is necessary for me to state that they were written years before Mr. Darwin's book was published.

conformation of our senses of hearing—on a Physical fact in our nature. As with regard to the principles on which the pleasure experienced from the recognition of beauty in the other Arts depends, in this also we may distinguish the enjoyment derived from the apperception of *time* as the *intellectual*, and this latter that pleasure afforded by the *sounds* themselves which mark the *time*, as the *sensuous* pleasure derived from Music.

Our minds become conscious through our senses of periods of duration, by means of two bodily instruments, our eyes and our ears; *i.e.* by *visible motion* and *by sounds*. Now, with regard to Musical sounds, our ears are so constructed that some sounds please us, and others give us pain.

The pleasure which we are capable of deriving from this source, as with regard to all other sensual pleasures, can be augmented very much by practice and attention. In fact, there seems to be no other of our bodily organs of sense which is capable of so much improvement as to its capability of experiencing pleasurable emotions by use as the ear.

Practice does not improve our organs of sight to any great extent, and much use of our organs of vision tends rather to injure them than otherwise.

But the apperception of the Beautiful in combinations of sounds is in most cases certain to be improved more and more by listening to pieces of Music, until what is called a musical taste is attained. As in all other tastes having their origin in the senses, this taste for harmonious combinations of *sounds* may become perverted. I believe there are many persons whose taste has in this respect become unnatural; and that some of the most eminent musical composers have pandered to this acquired taste will, I think, not be denied. This acquired taste consists in experiencing a certain delight from hearing either extraordinary combinations of sounds, or the effect of the execution of difficult passages of instrumentation, which latter only excite admiration on account of the evident invention of the composer or the skill of the performers, which astonish but do not please.

No doubt very beautiful effects are produced by difficult passages of instrumentation. Here I allude only to those which are written to display the skill of the performers, without any regard to the effect produced by the sounds themselves. If a musical box were so constructed as to play the same air in the same manner, there are few who would be so pleased at the sounds produced; therefore, in most cases, I believe if those persons who derive pleasure from such feats of manual dexterity will carefully examine their feelings, they will find that it is the difficulty with which they *know* the effects have been produced, and the ease with which the performer seems to overcome it, and not the particular sound produced by the performance, which affords them pleasure.

And here I wish to mention what seems to me to be a mistake of Dugald Stewart, in his *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, which touches on this point. When discussing the question whether we can attend to more than one thing at a time or not, he decides in the negative, and accounts for the apparent coexistence of several acts of thought by the rapidity with which the intellectual operations are carried on, so as to produce 'the same sensible effect as if they had been executed at one and the same moment.' In illustration of this he says: 'It is commonly understood, I believe, that in a concert of music a good ear can attend to the different parts of the music separately, or can attend to them all at once, and feel the full effect of the harmony. If the doctrine which I have endeavoured to establish be admitted, it will follow that in the latter case the mind is constantly varying its attention from one part of the music to the other, and that its operations are so rapid as to give us no perception of the interval of time.'[2]

With all due respect to an author of such celebrity as Mr. Stewart, I think the former case, to which he reduces the latter, is an impossibility. We cannot attend to the different parts of music in a concert separately. The different parts of music are different sounds. These different sounds are produced *simultaneously*, and come to our ears at one and the same moment; and however short a period of duration it may be, there must be some *minimum audibile* in which one sound composed, as we know, of various sounds, strikes on our ear. We may, when we hear this one sound, know, from *prior experience*, that it is composed of different sounds, produced from different instruments, and even from what particular set of instruments it has been produced; but this is an act of judgment; all we *heard* was one sound, at one *particular instant*. In this case, perhaps, I may be allowed to produce in evidence a personage who has always been considered as a most important witness in discussing Metaphysical questions—the savage.

Let us suppose a savage to hear a piece of music played on a pianoforte which he could not see. I doubt if he, on hearing two notes struck at the same instant, one in the treble and one in the bass, would know that the sound he heard was in reality a combination of two sounds. It appears to me that he would consider them as one sound, and that Mr. Stewart might as well assert that when we taste lemon-juice and sugar mixed together we perceive two distinct flavours; or when blue and yellow paint are mixed together we do not see green as one colour, but that our mind so quickly varies its attention from one colour to another, that we consider the blue and yellow colours as one, viz. green.

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[2] *Philosophy of the Human Mind.*

This mistake of Stewart's arose, I believe, from a confusion between the effect produced *on the instrument* (the ear) which conveys the sound to the mind, and the idea as conveyed to the intellectual principle itself. In the case of a person hearing a concert, there is at one and the same instant of time but one single sound which strikes on the ear; but the mind, *from prior experience*, is immediately able to *analyse* that single sound into its constituent elements, in reference to the musical instruments employed to produce it. The process, then, of the mind, when attention is paid to the sound produced by a concert of music, is one of *analysis*, not, as Stewart describes it, of *synthesis*.

The difference of the pleasure which we derive from listening to the same air when performed by a full orchestra and when given as a solo has its origin in the pleasure which the variety of the sounds produces on our sense of hearing, compared with the single note produced by one instrument. In the latter case, the melody is presented to *our intellectual faculties* in its simplest form; in the former case, it is so presented, but accompanied by additional effects, which appeal to a *sensual condition* of our nature.

This taste for variety may be carried to excess; it may become a fancy for,

1. Extraordinary combinations of sounds;
2. Loudness of the music;
3. Contrasts between the slowness and rapidity of the parts of the performance.

At first, the simple air gives us pleasure; after hearing it often, the sounds by which it is expressed *pall on our sense of hearing*, but only the *sounds;* the *time*, the *spirit*, the *soul* of the melody never palls on *our minds*. We wish to hear the same melody, with a *variety* in the sounds of which it is made up. The change delights us for a time. Again we wish for variation—to hear it rendered by a number of instruments simultaneously; then the more the number of the performers is increased, the more pleasure we receive, until at last mere loudness of sound seems to be the *desideratum.*

It was for this reason we have had the gigantic concerts at the Crystal Palace; but the Music was still *essentially* the same as when sung as a solo; its relation to *Time* never changed. There are few well-known melodies which have not, from time to time, been arranged by various composers, with intricate variations, in which the original idea is tortured into possibly the very opposite of what the original composer intended, with rapid transitions, from the greatest rapidity possible to the opposite extreme of slowness.

There are certain sounds in Nature which of themselves inspire us with ideas of the Beautiful and Sublime,

As instances of the former, those sounds which are the accompaniments of rural scenes—the song of birds, the sound of streams, &c.—may be given as examples. Of the latter, those sounds which inspire us with the usually concomitant feeling of the Sublime in Nature—that of *terror*—such as the roar of a cataract or peals of thunder.

But when an attempt is made to imitate such effects, so produced, by means of Musical sounds, these sounds ought to be as nearly as possible *imitations* of those the effect of which they are intended to reproduce. For this reason, all attempts to represent the sounds in Nature, by which we are inspired with emotions of the Sublime, by means of Musical effects never have been successful. On the other hand, imitations of those sounds in Nature by which we are impressed with an idea of the Beautiful have ever been received with the greatest admiration. There is a beautiful instance of this in the accompaniment to Tennyson's song of the 'Brook,' composed by Dolores, in which the *time* marked by the rippling of a mountain-stream is exactly imitated.

I have heard that song sung to such a natural accompaniment beside a mountain-stream, with the most charming effect. But in all musical representations of natural sounds, unless they are exact imitations, it is by the *Time,* and not by the *Melody,* that the likeness is suggested.

Music, then, depends for its capability of exciting emotions of the Beautiful on two laws or conditions of our being: the one Mental, the other Physical. The former is that universal and necessary law of all human intelligence, without which we cannot imagine or conceive any event as taking place—*the*

Mental condition Time. The latter is but a condition *of the manner in which our organs of hearing are formed, so as to give us delight in the apperception of certain sounds.* This, as all other conditions of our corporeal organisation, is neither universal nor necessary. A man born deaf never can experience the pleasure derived from *sounds,* though he can that from *time,* if he has other means than his ears of obtaining information as to relative periods of duration. And here I would wish to mention a conjecture which, if my views on this subject be correct, would seem not entirely destitute of probability.

It has been remarked, that of all the pleasures which we are capable of enjoying in our present state of existence in this world, that derived from Music is the only one which we can imagine we could be capable of in a purely intellectual state of existence. Hence it is that, in all descriptions of a future state of intellectual enjoyment, in all the attempts which educated men have made to give an idea of that which '*eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive,*' the pleasure derived from Music alone is that which does not seem gross and earthly, and inconsistent with our notions of a celestial paradise. For instance, in every scene which Milton describes as taking place in heaven, he introduces, *as part of the action*, the song of the celestial choir. Thus, for instance, in *Paradise Lost*, book iii.

> 'Then, crown'd again, their golden harps they took,
> Like quivers hung, and with preamble sweet
> Of charming symphony, they introduce
> Their sacred song, and waken raptures high:
> No voice exempt, no voice but well could join
> Melodious part, such concord is in heaven.'

Again, in book vii., after the creation, the Almighty is described as ascending

> 'Up to the heaven of heavens, His high abode,
> Follow'd with acclamation, and the sound
> Symphonious of ten thousand harps, that tuned
> Angelic harmonies.'

And in *Paradise Regained*, book i.

> 'So spake the Eternal Father, and all heaven
> Admiring stood in space, then into hymns
> Burst forth, and in celestial measures moved;
> Circling the throne, and singing, while the hand
> Sung with the voice.'

But if the principles which I have endeavoured to explain be true, and more especially the distinction I have instituted between *time* and *harmony*, it follows that in a state of existence *purely intellectual* (in which we would have *direct mental cognisance of things without the need of the intervention of senses to present them to our minds*), the law of *harmony*, being dependent only on the accidental conformation of our organs of hearing, would have no necessary existence, and the pleasure which we now derive from sounds and their combinations be entirely lost. I am conscious that this may seem at first sight a startling proposition, which in a few words is this: viz. that we are able to *conceive* a state of existence in which we could experience some of the pleasure we now derive from Music without *hearing* any sounds. I hope this conjecture may not seem so extravagant when the reader has considered the meaning of the following quotations. I only bring them forward for the purpose of showing that *we can conceive the possibility of such a state of existence.*

In the *Merchant of Venice* we have Shakespeare's notion of the 'Music of the Spheres' in these words:

> 'Look how the floor of heaven
> Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold;
> There's not the smallest orb that thou behold'st,
> But in his *motion like an angel sings,*
> Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubim.
> Such harmony is in immortal souls,
> But while *this muddy vesture of decay*
> Doth grossly close us in, we cannot *hear it.*'

The meaning of this passage is, that as every star revolves a musical effect is produced, which we, while enclosed in our corporeal nature, are unable to appreciate. But there is no impossibility in *conceiving* that what has been called the Music of the Spheres may consist in their *motion* alone, which we, owing to our present conditions of existence, are unable to realise, and that to but little higher phases of intelligence than ours such may be revealed. The same idea, though expressed in the inaccurate language of poetry, is produced in the following lines of Young:

> 'Nor think thou seest a wild disorder here,
> Through this illustrious chaos, to the sight.
> Arrangement and the chastest order reign.
> The path prescribed, inviolably kept,
> Upbraids the lawless sallies of mankind;
> Worlds, ever-moving, never interfere.
> What knots are tied! how soon they are dissolved!
> And set the seeming married planets free.
> They rove for ever, without error rove,
> Confusion unconfused; nor less admire
> This tumult untumultuous; all on wing,
> In motion all, yet what profound repose!
> What fervid action! yet no noise; as awed
> To silence by the presence of their Lord;
> Or hush'd by His command in love to man;
> And bid let fall soft beams on human rest—
> Restless themselves. On each cerulean plain,
> In exultation to their God and thine,
> They dance, they sing, eternal jubilee,
> Eternal celebration of His praise;
> But since their song arrives not at our ears,
> Their dance perplex'd exhibits to the sight
> Fair hieroglyphic of His peerless praise.
> Mark! now the labyrinthian turn they take,
> The circles intricate, and mystic maze,
> Weave the grand cipher of Omnipotence.
> To gods how great, how legible to man!'

It may be said that poetical quotations are hardly arguments suited to a philosophical discussion, but it must be remembered that all I want to show is the *conceivability* of such ideas; but an apparent objection meets me here. It can be said that this is but transferring the apperception of music from one corporeal organ to another; from the sense of *hearing* to that of *seeing*. It must be admitted that we cannot become conscious of anything external to us except through the medium of our senses. Yet I think that *the fact that we can conceive the possibility of such a transfer proves that some of the pleasure we derive from Music does not depend on the sense of hearing;* which is all I am contending for. We can *imagine* a person perfectly deaf deriving pleasure from seeing the movement of people dancing, or from the motion of the bâton of a leader of an orchestra; as we know that persons perfectly blind experience pleasure from hearing sounds, which enable them in some measure to realise effects produced by objects of sight.

I have been told by a friend that, once seeing a man who was quite blind standing close to the rails in a racecourse, he asked him what pleasure such a position could give him, who could see nothing of the horses running; he replied that it gave him great delight to *hear* the sound of the horses' hoofs as they raced past him, by which means he could form an idea of the swiftness with which they went.

Perhaps, in a similar manner, people perfectly deaf might be able in some measure to appreciate the time of a melody from seeing movements in accordance with it. In that beautiful piece of music, Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata, some such idea as I have endeavoured to put forward here seems to me to have been present to the composer's mind. The movement appears to represent the *time* marked by moonbeams reflected in rippling water. If such was the intention of the composer, we have here an instance of *visible* motion represented to the *ear* by sounds; which is the converse of what I have conjectured, that music may be represented to the eye by motion alone.

But the condition of *Time* is strictly *necessary* and *essential* to any idea we can form of Music, by whatever means suggested to our minds, either by sound or by sight. This follows, as has been stated, from the *necessity* and *universality* of the Time as a condition of our mental faculties. Therefore, if Music depends in any way on such a condition, by no effort of thought can we separate it from it, nor can we think of Music at all except in relation to Time.

We have seen, on the other hand, that it is possible to separate the idea of sound from Music; we can be conscious of *rhythmical notation* without hearing any sound. We can recall any melody in our minds, so as to derive pleasure from it, without being conscious of any sound. It is true that in the first instance we became conscious of the identity of a melody by hearing certain sounds, which mark the time, and so express its difference from other arrangements of notes. Once we know the air as played by one instrument, we may hear it played by another, with another absolutely different set of sounds; but as long as the *relation* of each note in time to each of the others is observed, it is the same air. It is only because we are so created as to render necessary the use of instruments to convey ideas to our minds, and that those instruments which are required for conveying *Musical* ideas to our minds by our ears are constructed in a certain manner, that we derive pleasure from sounds.

The enjoyment thus derived, which depends on our sense of hearing, can, like all other sensual enjoyments, be changed by habit. Such, then, are the principles, mental and bodily, on which, I believe, the apperception of the Beautiful in Music has its origin. I am conscious that my ignorance of the science of Music deprives me of the use of several other arguments which might be brought forward in support of this theory; and I can only hope that I have not weakened my position by entering, even as little as I have, into the subject. However, believing my arguments, drawn from *Psychological* facts, to be correct, any error I may have fallen into with reference to the science to which I apply them will, I consider, only tend the more to the establishment of the propositions which I have laid down, as it may be the means of suggesting to others stronger and better proofs. My argument has been simply this: If we consider what a piece of music is, we perceive that it consists of certain periods of duration, marked by certain sounds. We are capable of deriving the most exquisite pleasure from such a combination; and, on examination, we perceive that this is due both to the relation of the periods of duration to each other, marked by the notes, and to all, and also to the nature of the particular sounds themselves of which the air is composed.

The pleasure we derive from the perception of this relation of the periods of duration to each other I have referred to the Mental condition Time, and the latter, that from the particular sounds of the various notes, to the corporeal law of Harmony. On the latter depend all the rules which go to make up the science of Music, but which ultimately depend on the manner in which our bodily organs of hearing are adapted for the transmission of ideas, by means of sounds which affect them, to the Mind.

On these two laws of our constitution, the one *universal* and *necessary*, the other *particular* and *accidental*, the emotion which we experience from the Beautiful in Music has its origin.

Mr. H. Spencer, in *An Essay on the Origin and Function of Music*, discusses the *Physiological* basis of our apperception of pleasure from Music. As far as his arguments are intended to explain the manner in which the sounds in musical composition produce what I have distinguished as the *Sensuous* feeling, I cannot, from a sense of the authority due to any hypothesis put forward by such an eminent investigator of facts pertaining to *Physical Science*, venture to differ.

As far as relates to *loudness*, *quality*, *timbre*, *pitch*, or *intervals*, all of which expressions are referable to the manner in which *our bodily organs are formed to transmit sounds to our minds*, Mr. Spencer's explanation is probably correct; but when he comes to speak of *time*, his own words show that he is convinced that that *essential* characteristic of Music is not to be referred to the same causes. He says:

'Even the Rhythm which forms a remaining distinction between song and speech *may not improbably* have a kindred cause. Why the actions excited by strong feeling should tend to become Rhythmical *is not very obvious;* but that they do so there are divers evidences.'[3]

I have italicised the doubtful words in this quotation, to contrast them with the usually dogmatic manner of the author quoted in stating opinions with regard to Physiological facts concerning which he has a right to believe himself to a certain degree infallible.

I believe that in the preceding pages I have shown why it is that Rhythm in music gives us pleasure; viz. because it is based on the necessary conditions of the intellectual principle in man, so designed and formed to produce such effects by the beneficent will of our Creator.

The emotion of the Beautiful which we experience from Music has, like that produced by Painting, its origin in both *Mental* and *Physical* conditions of our constitution. When we are affected by the latter means, it is possible that certain other Physiological effects than those which the sounds themselves cause in our organs of hearing may be produced. 'All feelings then—sensations or emotions, pleasurable or painful,' says the author just quoted—'have this common characteristic, that they are muscular stimuli.'

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[3] *Essay on the Origin and Function of Music.*

Possibly, but it does not follow that Mental action can ever be resolved into, or accounted for by, Physical laws. No one doubts but that Mind and Matter, as Body and Soul, are ever acting and reacting on each other; it is the experience of every day life, in the action of our wills on our muscles; but there is this most important fact omitted in the assertion quoted, viz. that although all feelings have a tendency to stimulate our muscles, *it is in our power in most cases to restrain such tendency.* In Parliamentary language, then, I would propose, that after the word 'stimuli' the words *provided always that we allow them to be so*, be added. This *power*, of which we are directly conscious, to repress muscular excitement by Mental effort, *and a resolution formed to do so, even before we experience the sensation or emotion*, is one of the facts of consciousness to which I wish to call special attention; as it is our only knowledge of a *cause* other than that given in the relation of immediate unconditional sequence between Physical phenomena; and which latter is wrongly so called because wanting the essential part of such an idea as given in the relation between Volition and Mental phenomena—Productive power.

CHAPTER VI.

POETRY.

Thus far I have had, for the most part, to consider the pleasurable emotions, excited by the cognition of certain attributes of objects, which have their origin in the necessary laws or conditions of the Human Mind; Time and Space, in combination with certain corporeal or sensual conditions subservient thereto.

I have now to consider emotions which have their origin in the consciousness of the existence of the Human Mind itself; as evinced by certain states or passions which we ourselves experience, and the presumption of the existence of a like intellectual conformation in others of our species.

In treating of the emotions the result of the apperception of the Beautiful in Painting, I have endeavoured to show that, together with those feelings of pleasure which we derive from the realisation of such attributes in the creations of that Art depending on the Mental law of Space and the Physical condition relating to colours, there are certain other feelings excited which give us pleasure from a kind of sympathy between our thoughts and the idea which, as expressed by his work, the artist had in contemplation when he designed the picture.

Such feelings arise quite irrespective of any perception of superior excellence in the drawing or colouring of the painting as a work of Art, provided only that it is sufficiently well executed to convey the impression intended.

This pleasure arises from a recognition in the design of a sentiment having been present to the mind of the artist similar to one by which we ourselves are affected. And I think if this subject be carefully examined, these sentiments will be found to be, or to be capable of being resolved into, those feelings or passions the due exercise and indulgence of which tend to the benefit of our fellow creatures. The Creator has so ordained that there should be attached, as a motive for us to help each other, a certain amount of pleasure to the fact of our doing so, and even to the existence of ideas in our mind concerning acts of what are called benevolence, besides those of the parental and filial affections, &c. To this general law of the human species a great deal of the emotion of the *Beautiful* we derive from Poetry is due.

In all Poetry not descriptive, it is by appeals to *ourselves* as individuals, possessed of intelligence and its attributes which we believe are common to our species, that emotions of the Beautiful and Sublime are produced.

To appreciate the Beautiful, *in the result produced,* by this as by all the other Arts, the mind must have received some training, and on what that particular training of each one has been depends the kind of Poetical composition from which he usually receives pleasure. I say *usually,* because the particular temper, as it is called, which we are in at a particular time may have a great deal to do with the opinion which we form with regard to the work of a poet. If the ideas suggested to us '*fall in* with' the current of our thoughts, we feel pleasure; if not, the contrary.

How often we hear people say, 'I am in no humour for that sort of thing now,' when a poem is read to them, which at another time would call forth their enthusiastic admiration. There are too, in the character of individuals, certain causes which influence their opinion; arising in some from the society or enjoyments in which they have spent their lives, in others from some peculiarity in their individual constitution.

Moreover, there are other reasons which influence individuals in this respect; the metre in which a poem is written may recommend it to some, apart from its other merits as a work of Art. Metre is the arrangement of the words in rhythmical order. It depends for the pleasure which it causes, like Music, on the Mental condition Time, which it renders appreciable by marking recurring intervals of duration, and the more regularly these occur, the more agreeable is the effect produced.

For example, the kind of metre adopted by Lord Macaulay in the Poem of the 'Armada' derives its beauty from the *double recurrence* of rhythmical effect in every line; thus in the description in that Poem of the raising of the standard:

'With his white hair unbonneted,
the stout old sheriff comes,
Behind him march the halberdiers,
before him sound the drums.
The yeomen round the market cross
make clear and ample space,
For there behoves him to set up
the standard of her grace.
And haughtily the trumpets peal,
and gaily dance the bells,
As slow upon the labouring wind
the royal blazon swells.
Look how the lion of the sea
lifts up his ancient crown,
And underneath his deadly paw
treads the gay lilies down.

So stalk'd he when he turn'd to flight,
    on that famed Picard field,
Bohemia's plume and Genoa's bow
    and Cæsar's eagle shield.
So glared he when at Agincourt
    in wrath he turn'd to bay,
And crush'd and torn, beneath his claws,
    the princely hunters lay.
Ho! strike the flagstaff deep, sir knight!
    ho! scatter flowers, fair maids!
Ho! gunners, fire a loud salute!
    ho! gallants, draw your blades!
Thou sun, shine on her joyously!
    ye breezes, waft her wide!
Our glorious *semper eadem!*
    the banner of our pride.'

Rhyme, which is the recurrence of words of like sound at equal intervals, has its origin in the same law; and as this similarity of the sounds serves better to mark the *time*, so to the uneducated Rhyme is more pleasing than Rhythm as a characteristic of poetry. But like all pleasure derived from sound, we may get tired of recurring rhymes, and several authors have protested against the jingling of rhymes as compared with the

'Long majestic march and energy sublime'

of blank verse.

But Rhyme and Rhythm are but the *form* in which poetical ideas are conveyed; we have also the *matter* of poetical composition to consider, which excites emotions in us by virtue of that law of the human mind which reveals to us in Consciousness, as a part of our constitution, certain attributes, which we believe are possessed in common with us, in greater or less degree, by all the other individuals of our species.

These attributes, as before stated, are certain states or passions, to the due exercise of which a certain pleasure has been attached, by the will of our Maker, and all of which tend more or less to the benefit of the human family.

Further, even the recognition of such a state of feeling in the minds of others produces a like feeling in our own. This is what is expressed in the line:

> 'One touch of Nature makes the whole world kin.'

It is, I believe, by 'touches of Nature' that we are affected by the Beautiful in what I have called the *matter* of Poetical Composition. On the other hand, the emotion of the Sublime is, I believe, inspired by Poetry, which appeals to the intelligence itself. But in both cases there may be, apart from the ideas conveyed, a certain amount of delight produced from the excellence of the *form* of the work, the *manner* in which the ideas are expressed in words. This latter is an effect of admiration of the skill of the composer. In this sense Moore has been called a 'poetical jeweller'—to express the fact that the ideas in his poems are always set, as it were, with all the brilliant effects of polished language; but the true test of the beauty of the sentiments of which a piece of poetry is composed is how well they can bear to be expressed in other words. As an example of an idea set in elegant diction, with the same in the original, we may instance the rendering by that poet of the lines of Horace:

> 'Quo semel est imbuta recens, servabit odorem
> Testa diu.'
>
> 'Long, long may our hearts with such memories be fill'd,
> Like the vase in which roses have once been distill'd.
> You may break, you may shatter, the vase, if you will,
> But the scent of the roses shall hang round it still.'

But whether the elegance of the phraseology has in this case not weakened the original simile may well be doubted.

We feel pleased also with the readiness with which an idea is presented to the mind or imagination; an agreeable surprise is thereby produced. On the other hand, when a thought is only gradually unfolded to our minds, by being expressed in too many words, we become wearied by the effort to realise it, and so lose its full force. It is for this reason that a terse and pointed style is so agreeable; and on this account Tennyson's poetry is so telling. Excellence in the *form* of Poetical composition, then, seems to consist in producing in the mind of others, in as vivid and agreeable a manner as possible, ideas calculated to excite the feelings or sentiments common to all human intelligence.

But as to the *matter* of Poetical composition, there are two ways in which we may be affected by appeals to the feelings. We may experience pleasurable emotions *directly* from the ideas which are conveyed to our minds, or we may admire them in reference to their cause, an intelligence like to our own, of which they are the products.

The first is the *immediate* affection, the latter the result of a judgment depending on our belief in the existence in others of an intelligence possessed of attributes like our own. This pleasure depends almost entirely on experience, on a comparison of a great many examples of the same kind; and the more extensive such experience is, the more pleasure we derive from criticism of the works of others.

Perhaps the reason of this is, that the comparison of a great number of instances in which the same effect was attempted to be produced has the effect of rendering us more ready to perceive the intention of the artist or poet, and thus fully, as it were, to enter into his sentiments, so as to leave no emotion intended by him to be excited misunderstood. This *judicial* emotion can only be realised by those who have undergone a certain amount of intellectual training; and for this reason it is that few are able to appreciate the Sublime in Poetry. But the *immediate* affection is the result of the natural constitution of our minds, and affects all persons, provided their ordinary human feelings have not been perverted. There is no doubt but that the contemplation of virtuous actions performed by others, and from which we derive no benefit, gives us pleasure.

In the same way, the consideration of actions which tend to benefit others, and display what we call benevolence, is also a cause of pleasure to us.

Further, even the evidence of the existence in others of those feelings which are merely natural, such as the parental and filial affections, is also a source of mental gratification to us.

It is to produce such pleasurable emotions that the poet labours most successfully. We may admire the richness of the imagination or the intellectual power of the man who produces an epic poem; but the poems which give the most pleasure to the generality of mankind are those which appeal to the human sentiments of mankind. This distinction is well expressed by Longfellow in the lines:

'Come, read to me some poem,
Some simple and heartfelt lay,
Which shall soothe this restless feeling,
And banish the cares of day.

Not from the grand old masters,
Not from the bards sublime,
Whose mighty footsteps echo
Through the corridors of Time.

For, like strains of martial music,
Their mighty thoughts suggest
Life's endless toil and endeavour,
And to-night I long for rest.

Read from some humble poet,
Whose songs gush'd from his heart,
As rain from the clouds in summer,
Or tears from the eyelids start.'

The first and fourth of these stanzas describe the character of the poetry which most commonly produces emotions referred to as the effect of the Beautiful; the second and third, those which inspire us with notions of the Sublime.

In the former class of poems the feeling excited is *immediate* and *direct;* but in the latter, as has been before stated, there is a mental reference to an intelligence as a productive cause.

It is difficult to give an instance of the Sublime in poetry, because such emotion is the result of a judgment on an entire work, or a complete passage in a poem, having reference to the mind by which it was imagined and arranged.

On the other hand, it would be easy to give innumerable instances of those passages in poetical composition, consisting in some instances of merely sentences, in which that characteristic called the Beautiful is recognised, and for this reason, that in such instances there is an *immediate* result produced by the idea suggested in the subjective intellect, without relation to any particular cause.

But Poetry, of all the Fine Arts which I have treated of, has one peculiar characteristic, and that is, that it in no way depends on any fact in our Physical organisation for the emotions which it produces. In this Art alone, as in oratory, the human intellect affects directly, by means of signs, another intellect like itself. It is by appeals to those feelings or sentiments which we believe to be common to all human beings that the emotion of the Beautiful in Poetry is produced; and by a reference to such arrangements of words, which produce such effects to the mind which so arranged them, we come to have a notion of the Sublime. Thus the emotions of the Beautiful and Sublime, as exhibited in the Art of Poetry, have an almost purely intellectual origin; viz. in the Mental condition Time for the apperception of Rhythm; and in the Mental condition Personal Identity for the sympathy which makes us recognise in our own minds attributes which are the universal characteristics of our species.

Descriptive poetry, like that branch of the painter's art which aims only at the correct representation of Material objects, can only *reproduce* in our minds ideas or combinations of ideas which we have experienced before. In this, as in the other Arts, the universal law that the mind cannot create its own object holds good. Ideas suggested to the mind of another can only consist of those which the intellect has realised before, however skilfully combined to produce pleasurable emotions, according to our experience of what has given us delight.

Poetry, then, may be divided, as to the effects it produces on the appreciative mind, into *suggestive* and *descriptive*. The former *directly* and *immediately* excites emotions of the Beautiful in the subjective mind, by means of the ideas suggested by the words of which it is composed; the latter excites emotions of the Beautiful or Sublime by the apperception of the *images* which the words *represent* to our minds.

In the former case, we derive pleasure *directly* from a subjective sympathy; in the latter, from the recognition of the *representation* of some beautiful object. A like distinction has been drawn with reference to the products of Sculpture and Painting, between those which are mere representations of material objects, and those by and through which the artist meant to suggest ideas in the mind of the beholder other than admiration of the successful manner in which he had copied Nature. So also with regard also to the Sublime in Poetry, it is necessary to distinguish between that emotion as produced by the *representation* of an object in *Nature* which would inspire that passion, and the emotion produced by a reference to the superiority of the mind which created the work of Art itself. Thus we may experience a feeling of sublimity from the description of a scene of grandeur in Nature, as the description of the Alps in *Manfred,* or from the consideration of the intellect which produced *Paradise Lost.* To instance a parallel in Painting, we may experience a feeling of the Sublime on seeing a picture of Niagara, without any reference to the manner in which it was produced, or from the contemplation of Titian's Peter Martyr, with reference to the master intellect which designed it.

As an illustration of the first distinction I have drawn between Poetry which is beautiful, because it is a description of what is Beautiful in Nature, and that which is so called, because the words themselves excite in us pleasurable emotions, I think the two following quotations will suffice; the first from Scott:

'And now, to issue from the glen,
No pathway meets the wanderer's ken,
Unless he climb with footing nice
A far-projecting precipice.
The broom's tough roots his ladder made,
The hazel saplings lent their aid,
And thus an airy point he won;
Where, gleaming with the setting sun,
One burnish'd sheet of living gold,
Loch Katrine lay beneath him roll'd;
In all her length far winding lay,
With promontory, creek, and bay,
And islands that, empurpled bright,
Floated amid the livelier light;
And mountains that like giants stand
To sentinel enchanted land.
High on the south, huge Ben Venue
Down to the lake in masses threw
Crags, knolls, and mounds, confusedly hurl'd:
The fragments of an earlier world.
A wildering forest feather'd o'er
His ruin'd sides and summit hoar;
While on the north, through middle air,
Ben An heaved high his forehead bare.'

Here it is the beautifully *word-painted* picture presented to the imagination that gives pleasure.

For a different reason, the exquisitely simple song of Tennyson:

'As through the land at eve we went,
    And pluck'd the ripen'd ears,
We fell out, my wife and I,
We fell out, I know not why,
    And kiss'd again with tears.

And blessings on the falling out
  That more than all endears;
When we fall out with those we love,
  And kiss again with tears.

For when we came where lies the child
  We lost in other years,
There above the little grave,
O, there, above the little grave,
  We kiss'd again with tears.'

In this second instance, we perceive directly the beauty, without having any distinct image represented to our minds. It is merely the suggestion of what are called the Domestic affections which produces the effect; whereas, in the former case, it is the realisation of an image representing a lake, surrounded by lofty mountains, beautified by the effect of sunlight and shade.

In reference to the emotion of the Sublime as occasioned by the sight of natural objects, I before quoted the celebrated passage in *Childe Harold* descriptive of the Ocean. I can instance no better illustration of the Sublime in Poetry, *the result of a description of the Sublime in Nature.* But as the idea of the Sublime occasioned by the consideration of a poem as the work of a superior intellect has reference to such work as a whole, it is therefore impossible to give an instance in a quotation. All the foregoing observations have reference as well to the power which the Orator can exercise, with the exception of Rhythm, which is peculiar to Poetry; yet there is a something which resembles Rhythm in what are called well-turned sentences and rounded periods in the latter art. The novelist also can excite like emotions, by portraying or exhibiting scenes in which sentiments in accordance with such conditions of our nature are suggested as actuating the characters taking part in them. The poet, the dramatist, and the novelist, taking advantage of this general law of *sympathy,* have their power capable of being directed for the good or evil of not only the generation in which they live, but those in ages to come. Who can deny the influence of

'the great of old,
The dead, but sceptred sovereigns, who still rule
Our spirits from their urns'?

What an effect have not the works of Shakespeare had, not only on our language, but on the manners and customs of our country since his time! And in our own day, Tennyson and Dickens have contributed to form for the better the character of the English people.

Who can tell how often has the current of some man's life been turned from an evil to a better course by reading such lines as these?—

> ‘ Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control,
> These three alone lead life to sovereign power.
> Yet not for power (power of herself
> Would come uncalled for), but to live by law,
> Acting the law we live by without fear;
> And because right is right, to follow right
> Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.’

As it is said that every movement on this earth changes for ever, not only the position of this planet, but of all the others of our system, in space, as the pebble thrown from the hand of a child from the shore into the sea alters the equilibrium of this material sphere, so also in the moral universe every thought expressed and published to the people of the age in which we live may change for ever, for good or evil, the character, the opinions, and the conduct of nations yet to come.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION.

THROUGHOUT the preceding pages, all the arguments brought forward are based on the assumption of the existence of an entity altogether different from all Material objects, inasmuch as it is presented to us as the KNOWN CAUSE of effects; which idea is never given us as arising out of the experience which we have of the phenomena of the Material world.

In the investigation of the so-called *laws* of Physical Phenomena, we find certain relations as to antecedence and sequence between events.

By *experience* we discover that, in some cases, this relation is, as far as we have observed, *invariable*, and to the phenomena in such observed relation we give the names of causes and effects. But, as has been long since pointed out, all such so-called *physical* causes and effects are known to us only as antecedents and consequents, in as far as our experience informs us, an *apparently invariable* connection with each other. The idea of a *cause*, in the true sense of the word, *as a necessary connecting link between* *the antecedent as a power and the consequent as its result,* is never given in our experience of Material Phenomena.

In every theory which has been, even for a time, received as true, there must be some portion of truth, and there is this much truth in Materialistic Philosophy, viz. that, as far as we have experience of Physical Phenomena, we cannot *directly know* any such fact as an *Efficient* Cause.

So far Materialism is perfectly consistent. If all phenomena are the result of phases of Matter, we can know nothing of Mental or Efficient Causes. On such an assumption, such a system of Philosophy is on this point unanswerable, whether it be absolutely true or not. But the error of Materialism lies in dogmatically insisting on this assumption, and applying to all the Phenomena of which we have *cognition* a theory which is only true of part of our knowledge, viz. that of Material objects,—the facts of Physical Science.

Yet there is another set of facts of our experience, which are as *real* and as *knowable* as those of the Material world, in which the same relation as to antecedents and consequents is presented to us, but between which the true notion of causality is *immediately* suggested to our minds.

The great difficulty which Materialistic Philosophers find is their inability to account for the origin of the notion of cause in the sense of Efficient Power. I have quoted before the vague and unsatisfactory explanation of Mr. Mill with reference to the origin of this undeniable idea in our minds, and have shown that it is only on the assumption of the existence of Mind, as a knowable cause, that such an idea can be accounted for.[1] In every act of Consciousness, we *know*, more directly than we can know anything else, that we are Causes to our own Mental acts, to the states of our own intelligence.

Here, and here only, is given the *direct* notion of a Cause, in the true sense of the word, *as an antecedent, with productive power from which effects result.* No such idea is given us outside our consciousness. When, in the ordinary language of mankind, we *implicitly* assert that the same necessary condition exists between antecedents and consequents in the Phenomena of Physical existence, as we *know* exists between antecedents and consequents in the Phenomena of Mental existence, we are assuming an hypothesis; we transfer the idea of causation from our experience in consciousness, and apply it to facts of our experience of objects without us. In the former case, we have *direct cognition* of a known power connecting events together; in the latter, we *believe* a similar relation to exist between only as far as we know invariably-combined antecedents and consequents. In Physical Science, we postulate an unknown and unknowable cause, to account for this invariability of the relation of events as to antecedence and consequence which we observe throughout nature.

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[1] See ante, p. 42.

In Mental Science, the basis of all our knowledge is the direct experience we have of the power of our own Will to exert itself or not, to change the modifications of our Minds.

The supposed cause assumed as an explanation of facts of Physical Phenomena has been called Force; but Force is but an attribute of an antecedent.

When one billiard-ball strikes another, and the latter moves, *i.e.* changes its position in space, all we have here is antecedent and consequent; we *know* not that there is any necessary connection between the fact of the first ball striking the second and the latter moving. I have quoted this instance to show how we insensibly refer facts in Physical Science to laws which we are cognisant of only in our own constitution.

Why have men chosen the Phenomenon of Force as a representation of Physical Causation? Why does Force and its consequent appear more intimately connected than any other relation between antecedents and consequents, which comes within the scope of our experience in the generalisations which we form from observed facts of experience in the material world?

Simply because the phenomenon which we observe invariably following this particular antecedent is like to that which follows when by means of our muscles we act on matter.

It is an instance of the error pointed out by Bacon: 'because man makes himself the mirror of the universe,' and is ever anxious to explain everything by a reference to the laws of his own organisation.

But, as has been shown before, *what is commonly called our power to move our muscles by our Volition, is no more than a case of Physical Causation.*

The only Efficient Cause we can *know* is the power we possess by Volition to direct the current of our thoughts; to abstain or not from any Mental act, by an effort of Will. In Consciousness only we have such a *certain knowledge* of a cause; outside Consciousness, we have of such an existence but *belief.* Yet there are some men of very superior intellectual qualities, especially those necessary for the accurate observation of facts of Physical Science, who seem to fail altogether to realise this distinction between what is really *a cause* and what is but that idea transferred from the Phenomena of Mind (to which it is alone applicable), and applied to a supposed *necessary* condition of the relation between antecedent and consequent in Material Phenomena. Nay, farther, they speak and write as if in Material Phenomena alone we had evidence of such an existence, and therefore ignore altogether the real origin of such an idea as an *Efficient* Cause.

But supposing that there are two such distinct originals of Phenomena as Mind and Matter, let us consider why it is possible that men who honestly devote their attention to the discovery of truth should differ with regard to the existence of one of them.

Can it be that, by the diligent prosecution of the study of either, there is a tendency produced in the Human Mind to become so absorbed in the contemplation of the facts presented by it as to render difficult the realisation of the phenomena presented by the other?

I believe that this is the case, and that this accounts for the fact that those who devote their attention to the study of Physical Science—to Natural History and Chemistry—are so much opposed to the reception of theories appertaining to Mental Science.

On account of the fact that their minds have been exclusively given up to the consideration of phenomena which are in their nature so utterly dissimilar to those of Mind, they become unable to *conceive* the existence of facts other than those presented in Material investigations. I believe that an exclusive application to any one branch of study unfits the mental faculties for a just and impartial observation of the facts presented in other sources of knowledge. As Bacon observes: 'Some men become attached to particular sciences and contemplations, either from supposing themselves the authors and inventors of them, or from having bestowed the greatest pains upon such subjects, and thus become most habituated to them. If men of this description apply themselves to philosophy and contemplations of an universal nature, they wrest and corrupt them by their preconceived fancies, of which Aristotle affords us a signal instance, who made his Natural Philosophy subservient to his Logic, and thus rendered it little more than useless and disputatious. The chemists, again, have formed a fanciful philosophy, with the most confused views, from a few experiments of the furnace.'[2]

Thus it appears to me that many of the eminent naturalists of the present day, 'having become attached to that particular Science,' and also 'from having bestowed the greatest pains upon such subjects,' when they apply themselves to contemplations of *a universal nature, however earnestly they seek the truth*, yet, unknown to themselves, wrest and corrupt the facts presented to them to suit their preconceived fancies; but, unlike Aristotle, they make their Metaphysics subservient to their Natural Philosophy, or deny the existence of a basis for the former science altogether.

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[2] *Novum Organum*, book i.

Stewart also draws attention to this tendency in the human mind. 'It would appear, then,' he says, 'that there are two opposite extremes into which men are apt to fall into in preparing themselves for the duties of active life. The one arises from habits of abstraction carried to excess; the other, from a minute, an exclusive, and an unenlightened attention to the objects and events which happen to fall under our actual experience.'[3]

And again: 'It is observed by Dr. Reid that the power of reflection (by which he means the power of attending to the subjects of our consciousness) is the last of our intellectual faculties which unfolds itself, and that in the greater part of mankind it never unfolds itself at all. It is a power, indeed, which being subservient merely to the gratification of metaphysical curiosity, is not essentially necessary for us to possess in any considerable degree. The power of observation, on the other hand, which is necessary for the preservation of even our animal existence, discovers itself in infants long before they attain the use of speech, or rather, I should have said, as soon as they come into the world; and when Nature is allowed its full scope, it continues active and vigorous through life. It was plainly the intention of Nature that in infancy and youth it should occupy the mind almost exclusively, and that we should acquire all our necessary information before engaging in speculations which are less essential; and accordingly, this is the history of the intellectual progress in by far the greater number of individuals.

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[3] *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, cap. iv. § 7.

'In consequence of this, the difficulty of metaphysical researches is undoubtedly much increased; for the mind, being constantly occupied in the earlier part of life about the properties and laws of matter, acquires habits of inattention to the subject of consciousness, which are not to be surmounted without a degree of patience and perseverance of which few men are capable; but the inconvenience would evidently have been greatly increased if the order of Nature was in this respect reversed, and if the curiosity had been excited at as early a period by the phenomena of the intellectual world as by those of the material.'[4]

Locke also notices this fact in our nature in these words: 'For though he that contemplates the operations of his mind cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them, yet unless he turn his thoughts that way, and considers them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture or clock may be so placed as to come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts they are made of till he applies himself with attention to consider them each in particular.'[5]

But how much more must not the difficulty of Metaphysical researches be increased in the case of those who have all their lives entirely devoted their attention to the study of the properties and laws of matter?

My contention is, that it is as impossible to argue with such men as to the existence or non-existence of intellectual facts of knowledge, as it would be to convince a man who was *colour-blind* of the distinction between crimson and scarlet.

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[4] *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, cap. vi. § 8.

[5] *Essay on the Human Understanding*, book ii. cap. i.

As a matter of prudence, then, how much reason have students of Physical Science to be careful how they rashly dogmatise concerning researches in that intellectual science which they have not devoted themselves to! How many distinctions relating to the Science of Mind may not be *unthinkable* and *inconceivable* to them which are not so to others used to such speculations! The hopeless confusion with regard to the word Cause before alluded to, in which two distinct ideas, that of an *Efficient* Cause and that which is called a *Physical* Cause, are mixed in one vague notion, is an instance of such inaccuracy of thought.

But so far from the diffidence which on this account we might expect from such authors, they, with the most arrogant assumption of authority, put forward their opinions concerning matters which they do not and cannot know sufficient of to authorise such oracular statements. Because they have discovered a certain number of facts concerning animal life and its physical conditions, they assert their capability to decide questions on all subjects of human experience.

Because they are eminent in Physical Science, or in one particular branch of it, that of Natural History, they assume a right to dogmatise concerning facts of Mental Science of which they know comparatively nothing.

'Your believer in mere natural laws and natural selection,' says Dr. M'Cosh, 'has but seen half the truth, or rather he has not seen half the truth. Like one of those insects which he may have been microscopically examining, he has seen only the smallest objects. Mole-like, he has been burrowing a dark and confined tunnel through the underground clay, instead of walking upright like a man, and looking around him on the extended earth, and up into the expanse of heaven. He has used the microscope, and seen the infinitely little; but he refuses to look through the telescope, which shows him how the littles are formed into structures of infinite greatness and grandeur. All no doubt proceeds from natural laws; but these are made to work out typical forms geometrically correct and æsthetically beautiful. The cold winter gives us frost work, and the warm summer yields us flowers; and contemporaneously there appear intellect and taste to measure and appreciate it. The blind forces are made by One who has eyes to evolve ideas, patterns, exemplars, which perceiving minds are constructed to behold and admire. Finally, above the Physical, above the Intellectual even, there rise the morals, like stars out of the dust, or rather like stars out of the other stars, only brighter, purer, and more enduring.'[6]

I have quoted this last passage lest it might be thought that the others were but examples of an older, and consequently exploded, Philosophy.

It is equally true that an exclusive attention to facts of Mental existence has a like tendency in the opposite direction, viz. to weaken the power of observation of particular instances; and no doubt, could we entirely devote our mental faculties to such subjects, the students of Mental Science might be as dogmatic with reference to the non-existence of Matter as students of Physical Science are as to the non-existence of Mind.

But as a matter of fact, it is impossible, from the peculiar condition in which we are placed, to allow our minds to be entirely taken up with the consideration of Psychological realities. The necessary interruption which the affairs of life impose on us, and the fact that we are surrounded by a universe of Material objects, prevent so great an effect being produced on the minds of those devoted to Mental speculations as that which, from the peculiar nature of their study, is produced in those who investigate the Phenomena and laws of the Material world. Yet even with all the causes which militate against the effects of an exclusive attention to Mental Science, it is an admitted fact that such studies, however they improve the reasoning powers, unfit men in a great degree for the practical business requisite in their daily intercourse with their fellow men.

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[6] *Christianity and Positivism*, p. 52.

Has not there been in all ages a distinction drawn between men of contemplative and of active minds?—between the student and the man of business, the cloister and the world?

Would not naturalists doubt the correctness of arguments as to the general laws of Natural Science drawn from observations of Physical Phenomena made by eminent Metaphysicians, more especially if such arguments were in direct opposition to their own opinions. For were it not that our attention is so occupied in the daily occurrences of life by the Phenomena of Matter, it is perfectly conceivable that students of Mental Science would combat the existence of any *logical* basis for the generalisations of Physical Science.

From this consideration it follows, that it is, to say the least of it, presumptuous in men to insist on the non-existence of ideas in the mind of others, only because they themselves cannot realise such in thought. For instance, Mr. Herbert Spencer's argument is this: that because he cannot *conceive* the existence of a *knowable* cause, that therefore no one else can. But what he means by *Knowable* is, *perceivable by the senses.* What he means by *Unknowable* is that which is *Unseen,* or *Unheard,* or *Unperceived* by any of the other senses. So far he is perfectly right (as Hume proved long since) when he says that in Material Phenomena an Efficient Cause is unknowable. This is no new discovery; it is merely a new edition of the Philosophy of Hume; and therefore does not warrant investing the word 'unknowable' with a capital letter, like a grenadier's cap, to make it look like as if it had a meaning by itself. According to the old grammatical definition of Lindley Murray, 'An adjective is a word which cannot *stand by itself* in reason or signification.'

No amount of capital letters will make adjectives have a meaning by themselves, no more than grenadiers' caps served out to Falstaff's 'men in buckram' would make them serviceable troops.

A system of Philosophy based on such confused and indeterminate ideas is the direct result of mental inability to speculate on intellectual facts, induced by too great an attention to the accumulation of particular instances in Physiological Science.

Thus Modern Philosophy is nothing more or less than the old Sensational Philosophy, which was *logically* carried out to its conclusion by Hume (and found since unable to account for other important facts in our nature other than those derived from the senses), to which has now been added a contradiction in terms— an Unknowable Cause.

It is only on the assumption of the existence of Mind as well as Matter, as the two ultimate facts of our nature on which all our knowledge depends, that we can explain all the phenomena of our being. To the existence of Mind, I have, *in the first instance*, referred all those emotions which we experience from apperception of the attributes of beauty and sublimity, as results of the laws which are the universal and necessary conditions of all Human intelligence; and in the second place, to certain Physiological characteristics of our corporeal organisation.

The pleasure which we experience from the contemplation of the results of the Arts of Sculpture, Architecture, and Painting has its primary origin in the Mental condition Space, on which depend ultimately all our notions of extension and proportion, combined with the effect which is produced in our organs of vision on account of the manner in which they are fitted for the *receptivity* of certain sensations of colour. But each of these branches of the Fine Arts, in the order in which I have considered them, has less dependence for the emotions caused by its products on the latter, or *Sensuous* condition of our being.

Sculpture least of all; and by some it is considered that in the objects which are the results of this Art, colour is not at all admissible as a means of increasing the effect produced. In Architecture, colour by what appears to be a certain conventional agreement is allowable; but in Painting very much of the emotion of the Beautiful depends on a concordance with certain rules of that Art which are based on the peculiar Sensuous conditions of the instruments by means of which we see.

The pleasurable emotions caused by Music have their origin, in the first place, in the Mental law of Time, and, secondly, on certain Physical conditions of our sense of hearing. In this branch of the Fine Arts, as in Painting, the pleasure seems equally derived from both Mental and Physical conditions of our organisation; but as I have shown, the former is a *necessary* and the latter an *accidental* circumstance, on which the apperception of beautiful effects in Music is based.

Poetry depends for the emotions which it excites in our minds, in some degree like Music, on the Mental condition Time. So far as the Rhythmical arrangement of the words gives us pleasure, it is by the division which such an arrangement makes evident to us of recurring periods of duration, and such may be called in this Art the *formal* condition of its products.

But in a far-greater degree the *matter* so presented to us excites pleasurable emotions, by representing to us ideas which arouse in our minds certain sentiments having reference to the attributes of our Personal Identity as human beings, and which we believe we have in common with other individuals of our species.

Thus every branch of the Fine Arts depends ultimately on an Intellectual Principle.

Sculpture, Architecture, Painting, on the Mental condition Space; Music, on the Mental condition Time; and Poetry in some measure on the same principle, but for the most part on the law of Personal Identity.

But in most of these cases there are also other *Sensuous* conditions which contribute to the pleasure which is conveyed to minds capable of appreciating beauty in Works of Art.

As beings so constituted as to be adapted for the reception of such pleasure, if we admit the evidence of design throughout the Universe, we cannot but believe that we were thus created for the particular purpose that we should experience this pleasure from the contemplation of outward external objects.

But there is another emotion excited by the contemplation of Works of Art, and which is called the Sublime.

This emotion has its origin in our consciousness of Mental Power developed in the Principle of Causality, and is suggested by a reference of works of Art to their *productive cause*, an intelligence like our own, *an objective intellectual entity* like that which we *know* ourselves to be, and contrasting the results of such with our own inferior capability to produce the same.

Such I believe to be the ultimate Principles in our nature on which the emotions of the Beautiful and Sublime, as suggested to us by the contemplation of works of Art, depend. No doubt, as Physical Science advances, it may be possible that these Physical laws of our being, which I have described under the general name of the Corporeal Conditions of the apperception of the Beautiful in the Fine Arts, may be explained, as to the manner in which such sensations are produced in our bodies, in the words of Mr. Herbert Spencer, 'appreciated by the sensory ganglia or primitive nervous centres;' or in the words of Locke, 'by trains of motion in the animal spirits.' But I believe I have shown that from their very nature it is utterly impossible that *Intellectual* phenomena can ever be accounted for or explained by the laws which affect only the *Material* part of our nature.

Thus, by a fair, impartial, and extended consideration of *all* the facts of Human Nature, and by referring each to the particular means by which we are informed of its existence, we may come in time to realise the exact province in which the Students of Mental and Physical Science have a right to assert their capabilities to explain facts of the Intellectual or Material world.

If there is any hope of a reconciliation between the Students of these Sciences, it will be effected by distinctly marking the boundaries between the domains of each.

Such has been the object of this book: to show that the emotions produced by the apperception of the Beautiful and Sublime in works of Art are the combined effect of laws and conditions, which are the separate attributes of the distinct though constituent parts of our nature, Mind and Matter, Soul and Body.

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